Success below the surface : explaining success in the management of petrolium resources in Norway and Brazil by Gonzales Rodriguez, Marco Antonio
Success below the surface - Explaining success in
the management of petroleum resources in Norway
and Brazil
Marco Antonio Gonzales Rodriguez
DepartmentofEconomicsandResourceManagement
MasterThesis30credits2013
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
 
The writing of this thesis has at times been both challenging and frustrating. However, it has 
been a learning experience and it has also given me much more interest in the topic. 
 
First of all I would like to thank my supervisor, Carl Brønn for his patience, support and 
advice during the process of writing this thesis. 
 
I would also like to thank to my family and friends in Norway and Bolivia for supporting and 
motivating me. Sincere gratitude also to my friends from the Department of economics and 
resource management at the University in Ås.  
 
Finally, I want to thank my wife for helping me with the language and proofreading and for 
help and trust during the work with this thesis. 
 
The responsibility for possible errors in the following text remains mine. 
 
Oslo, 7 August 2013 
 
Marco Antonio Gonzales Rodriguez 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
1  
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is about the petroleum sectors in Norway and Brazil and studies the relationship 
between the state and the national oil companies. Both Norway and Brazil have been 
successful in the management of petroleum resources. In this thesis I analyze how 
organizational cultural factors can contribute to a better understanding and explanation of 
success in the petroleum management in Norway and Brazil. In this thesis success in the 
petroleum sector is defined as a country’s ability to manage the petroleum resources in a way 
that 1) yields economic growth through resource rents, 2) ensures society’s benefit and 
control and 3) meets national goals for the sector. 
 
This study is qualitative and comparative, using a theory of organizational culture in case 
studies of Norway and Brazil in order to understand better why both these countries have 
obtained success in their petroleum management despite the differences between the countries 
on other explanatory variables. Through analyzing the organizational cultural traits of 
involvement, adaptability, mission and consistency in the principal-agent relationships 
between the states and the national oil companies (NOCs) Statoil and Petrobras, this thesis 
investigates the causal relationship between organizational culture and success.  
 
The states and the NOCs are interdependent in the development of the petroleum sector. 
Shared values and goals are therefore important for successful development over time. 
Through studying the cultural traits of the organization building in the petroleum sectors in 
Norway and Brazil, this thesis has found that both the organizational cultures in the principal-
agent relationships between the states and the NOCs and the organizational culture within the 
NOCs score high on all the four abovementioned cultural traits. Strong organizational culture 
in the petroleum sector is thus positively related to petroleum success in both Norway and 
Brazil. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Petroleum resources are non-renewable, scarce and unevenly distributed between countries. 
They are also valuable and able to yield great income to the countries lucky enough to host 
them. However, many petroleum rich countries have not been able to manage the resources in 
a successful way, they have failed to benefit from their natural wealth and experienced the 
resource curse (Soros 2007:XI).  
 
The petroleum sector is complex and successful management involves many interdependent 
actors that all need to avoid the common pitfalls of the resource curse (see e.g. Larsen 2004, 
Thurber et al. 2011, Karl 1999). Some countries are nevertheless successful (ibid.). This thesis 
starts with an interest in understanding why these countries have succeeded in petroleum 
management.  
 
Since the petroleum sector is complex, success consists of several interdependent factors. 
First of all the country has to explore and produce petroleum and generate resource rents. 
Second, the resource is national property and thus owned by the country’s population, so 
successful management of the resources and spending of the resource rent should maximize 
society’s benefit and the population’s control of the rents. Finally, successful management 
involves meeting the country’s own goals for the sector. In accordance with this complexity, 
this thesis defines success in the petroleum sector as a country’s ability to manage the 
petroleum resources in a way that 1) yields economic growth through resource rents, 2) 
ensures society’s benefit and control and 3) meets national goals for the sector.  
 
According to Thurber et al. (2011) Norway and Brazil have both succeeded in managing their 
petroleum sectors. They have achieved good performance and managed to make petroleum a 
driver for economic growth and development. Today Norway is one of the world’s largest oil 
exporters and Brazil is considered an important emerging exporter of oil and a technological 
leader in deep-water activities. Norway and Brazil also both have high scores on all the 
success indicators in this thesis, their petroleum sectors are thus more successful than similar 
sectors in many other countries.  
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In order to explore the question of why some countries succeed in their petroleum sector 
management and avoid the resource curse, this thesis concentrates on the upstream petroleum 
sectors in Norway and Brazil, and particularly the relationship between the state and the oil 
companies. The exploration and production of petroleum are very specialized activities, and 
as owner of the resource the state needs to rely on oil companies to perform these tasks on its 
behalf. The relationship between the state and the company is a classical principal-agent 
relation where the state as the principal depends on the company to generate resource rent, 
while the company, being the agent can use its asymmetric information about the petroleum 
resource to cheat the state and keep more of the resource rents for itself (Hults 2012:66-69). 
As most other resource rich countries, both Norway and Brazil have created national oil 
companies (NOCs) to alleviate the problem of asymmetric information, but the relationship 
between the state and the NOC is still one of principal-agent, where the agent also depends on 
the principal for access to the resource and development possibility (ibid.) 
 
However, even if both Norway and Brazil are successful petroleum managers, they are also 
very different cases. In Norway, the presence of a stable economic, political and institutional 
context has been highlighted as the key to successful petroleum management (Larsen 2004, 
Thurber et al. 2011, Karl 1999).The political and institutional frames and structures that are 
emphasized as constituting a favorable context for petroleum management success in Norway, 
are however quite different in the Brazilian case. I therefore argue that other, more sector 
specific variables are required in order to understand how similar successful developments 
have taken place in both countries. Within the tradition of management research, scholars 
have emphasized the invisible cultural values, norms and practices as important explanatory 
factors in their analyses of what leads to successful management (Denison and Mishra 1995, 
Zamanou and Glaser 1994).  
 
The national context will always have an effect on success in the petroleum sector. However, 
a principal-agent relationship based on a strong common organizational culture will make the 
actors in the sector more able to foresee and handle internal and external challenges. Political 
changes, economic volatility and institutional weakness are also such challenges that can be 
foreseen and handled much better if the actors in the petroleum sector are enabled through an 
organizational culture that score high on involvement, adaptability, mission and consistency. 
Through studying the cultural traits of the organization building in the petroleum sectors in 
Norway and Brazil, this thesis has found that both the organizational cultures in the principal-
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agent relationships between the states and the NOCs and the organizational culture within the 
NOCs score high on all the four abovementioned cultural traits. Strong organizational culture 
in the petroleum sector is thus positively related to petroleum success in both Norway and 
Brazil.  
  
1.1 Research question 
This thesis has a holistic approach to the petroleum sectors in Norway and Brazil and argues 
that the different actors in the sector are mutually dependent. I argue that the organizational 
culture developed through the principal-agent relationship is crucial for the organizational 
cultural development within the NOC, and later also the other way around. The “principal-
actor” I focus on in this thesis is the ministry of energy representing the state in the petroleum 
sector in both Norway and Brazil. The role of other state actors, such as the national 
regulatory body and the national assembly, will also be analyzed where they are relevant for 
the principal-agent relationship. The “agent-actor” I focus on in the national oil companies in 
the petroleum sectors in Norway and Brazil; Statoil and Petrobras respectively.  
 
The research question for this thesis is exploratory rather than testing. I am interested in 
exploring how the factors of organizational culture can complement the understanding of the 
success in petroleum management in Norway and Brazil and contribute to explaining the 
similarities between two otherwise relatively different cases. This thesis considers the 
following main research question: How can an analysis of organizational cultural factors 
contribute to a better understanding and explanation of success in the petroleum sector 
management in Norway and Brazil?   
 
1.2 Contribution and scope of this thesis 
This thesis starts with a review and analysis of existing literature on petroleum success in 
Norway and Brazil. From the analysis of previous findings, it is established that both Norway 
and Brazil have escaped the resource curse and have managed to turn their petroleum 
resources into a valuable source of income for their countries. This has been possible in both 
these countries despite quite different political, economic and cultural contexts.  
 
In order to narrow the focus to a manageable research question for a study of this scope, a 
step back to the basic dynamics of the petroleum sector is useful. In accordance with Marcel 
(2006:5) this thesis argues that the main first source to success in the petroleum sector is the 
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generation of resource rent through the upstream activities of oil and gas extraction and 
production. The journey from the resource extraction to society’s benefit of the resource rent 
is however dependent on the actors in the sector, their abilities and the relationship between 
them. This can be studied through analyzing the organizational culture in the petroleum 
sector.  
 
This thesis contributes with a comparative perspective on the petroleum sectors in Norway 
and Brazil. I argue that the analysis of organizational cultural traits can contribute to 
explaining how successful management has emerged and been consolidated throughout the 
petroleum sectors in both these countries. Through comparing the organizational culture in 
the petroleum sector in a country with favorable national conditions to the organizational 
culture in the petroleum sector in a country without these favorable conditions, but with the 
same successful outcome, this thesis contributes to theory building on how organizational 
culture is related to successful management.  
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The next section outlines the background for this thesis and presents a literature review of 
previous studies and the different success factors often highlighted in studies of the petroleum 
sector in Norway and Brazil. It also introduces the literature on organizational culture and 
previous use of these theories in petroleum sector studies. Section 3 introduces the conceptual 
framework for the analysis, and sector 4 presents the discussion of the methods and research 
design. In section 5 the case studies of Norway and Brazil are presented, including an analysis 
of the relationship between organizational culture and success in each country. Section 6 
presents the comparative analysis of the two cases and the conclusion is presented in section 
7.  
 
2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 The Petroleum Sector 
Petroleum is a subsoil resource. Independent of private property rights in the particular areas 
where they are found, the legal regulation in most countries classifies these resources as 
national assets and thus state property1. The state is therefore responsible for the management                                                         1 The main exception to this kind of regulation is the United States (Guirauden 2007:179).  
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of the resource and can also claim rents from the resource (Sachs 2007:180). How this 
management is exercised nevertheless varies between states. States can choose to sell the 
property right to private companies, thus limiting its income to the sale price and eventual 
revenue taxes. On the other extreme, states can exercise full monopoly with state companies 
performing all actions in the sector. In between these two options exist numerous hybrid 
management possibilities (Guirauden 2007:179-180). 
 
According to Mommer (2002) the economic literature that is based on studies of 
manufacturing and other industrial production often argue that the ownership of resources 
does not matter as long as the production takes place in an open economy where the market 
sets the right price on the commodity. In his study of governance models for mineral 
resources, Mommer (2002:6) argues that the disregard of the importance of ownership in 
economic literature causes problems for economic studies of the petroleum sector. Since 
petroleum resources require long-term investments and perspectives, Mommer (2002:88) 
argues that the technical and economic advantage of public resource ownership is proven 
beyond doubt. But it may be difficult for states to manage their resources in an efficient way, 
and in any management regime the different actors have to work together towards a common 
goal if success is to be attained (Mommer 2002).  
 
Mommer (2002:3) mentions three main actors as important; first, the government as owner of 
the resource, represented by the ministry of energy or equivalent agent; second, the producing 
companies that make investments and take risks, these can be both national and international 
oil companies; third are the consumers that have to pay the price of the final product. In many 
countries there are also concession agents or regulative bodies that operate between the 
ministry and the oil companies. Since this thesis concentrates on the management of the 
upstream part of the petroleum sector, the government actors and the companies are the actors 
included in this study.  
 
International oil companies (IOCs) have existed since the beginning of commercial petroleum 
extraction and their influence in the world oil market has varied with the activities of OPEC 
(Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries) and other sector developments. National oil 
companies (NOCs) “are political creations” (Victor et al. 2012:23). Many NOCs were created 
by governments that wanted to gain better control of their petroleum sectors and keep more of 
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the resource revenues for themselves. However, the performances of NOCs can vary between 
countries and only a few NOCs are economically efficient (ibid.).  
 
According to Marcel (2006:5), the upstream petroleum business is a “battleground for 
resource nationalism”. Performing upstream activities are the most important for NOCs, as 
these are “the revenue-generating activities that make [NOCs] so important to their country” 
(Marcel 2006:5).  Not all NOCs are fully state-owned, but the relationships between the 
NOCs and the state are still strong and most NOC employees feel they are part of a national 
project (Marcel 2006:6).  
 
The success of this national project however, depends, according to Marcel (2006:8-9) on the 
national operating environment and how this environment “improves or reduces the national 
oil companies’ capacity to respond to external challenges” (Marcel 2006:9). The capacity of 
both the NOCs and the state agents in the petroleum sector to deal with new internal and 
external challenges is crucial for success according to Marcel (ibid.).  
 
2.2 The resource curse 
Petroleum resources and the potential wealth that comes with them have engaged scholars 
from different disciplines for decades. Especially the apparent paradox that resource rich 
countries tend to score lower on a number of economic development indicators than countries 
without petroleum do, has been analyzed from different perspectives, trying to find 
explanations and solutions for countries to avoid this resource curse. Some of the findings in 
the economic literature are of particular interest to this thesis. 
 
The starting point for much of the resource curse literature is the possibility states have to use 
the resource rent to the favor of its populations, but their lack of success in attaining this. 
Segal (2012) emphasizes how resource rents differ from other types of government income; 
“resource rents are the closest we are to manna from heaven” (Segal 2012:340). Still, Segal 
argues, this rent income is extremely hard to manage since the income level is volatile and the 
resource is exhaustible. Petroleum rich countries often spend too much when the rent income 
is high, causing economic problems when rents decrease due to lower oil extraction or prices. 
Segal (2012:347) recommends long-term planning and saving to avoid these problems. He 
argues against spending that is not economically profitable, such as fuel subsidies and public 
sector over-staffing. The whole population should benefit from resource rents, but direct 
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distribution programs that target poor people and reduce inequality are also recommended 
(Segal 2012). 
 
2.3 Previous studies of the petroleum sectors in Norway and Brazil 
Scholars investigating the resource curse have also been quite interested in studying the case 
of Norway, as one of the few countries that have moved in the opposite direction of the 
resource curse and turned its petroleum resource into a source of economic growth and socio-
economic development. Karl (1999) is one of the scholars that have followed the development 
in petroleum rich states and she has written extensively on the resource curse challenge, 
calling it the “paradox of plenty” (Karl 1999).  
   
According to Karl (1999), Norway has been able to implement many of the recommended 
policies for successful petroleum management, such as an oil fund that removes oil revenues       
from the day-to day control and spending of politicians (Karl 1999:45). In explaining 
Norway’s success she emphasizes the functioning judicial system, civil society interest groups 
and well-organized non-oil industrial interests that were already in place when petroleum 
rents started flowing into the government, preventing the creation of an over-spending oil-
renter economy (Karl 1999). 
 
Larsen (2004) has studied how Norway avoided both the resource curse and the Dutch disease 
and he agrees with many of Karl’s conclusions. Larsen (2004) says Norway lagged behind its 
neighboring countries in economic development and growth in the 1960s, but performed 
better than the same neighbors in the 1990s. This economic development coincides with the 
discovery and development of petroleum resources and Larsen (2004) argues that this proves 
that Norway escaped the resource curse. According to Larsen (2004), the main reason for this 
success was the already established centralized wage negotiations in Norway that made sure 
manufacturing remained the wage leader and kept focus on the interests of the competitive 
industry sector.  Like Karl (1999), Larsen (2004) also points out that Norway made sure the 
spending of oil revenues was macroeconomically sound and used much of the revenues for 
savings and investments abroad in order to avoid high volatility in the national economy.  
 
In a World Bank working paper Eifert et al. (2002) investigate how political economy can 
explain differences in success in oil exporting countries. They emphasize long-term saving, 
short-medium-term stabilization and effective use of rent income, and find that countries that 
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perform well on one of these indicators typically have been able to do well on the others 
(Eifert et al. 2002:25). They further find that political economy factors are much more likely 
to be barriers to successful management than technical factors are (ibid.). Eifert et al. (2002) 
also emphasize the success of Norway and find that the democratic system in Norway, with 
consensus building, transparent budgetary processes and non-oil traded sectors that favor 
cautious petroleum management, constitutes a clear advantage for successful management for 
petroleum resources.  
 
Over the years Norway has been used as an example to follow for other resource rich 
countries, but not all scholars think a success recipe is exportable. Thurber et al. (2011) have 
studied Norway’s relative success in managing its hydrocarbon sector, the development of 
institutions and separated government functions. Their point of departure is that international 
development institutions have recommended other petroleum rich countries to organize their 
petroleum sectors in accordance with the “Norwegian model”; using three different 
government bodies; a government ministry, a regulatory body and a national oil company. 
After analyzing the developments in the petroleum sectors in ten other countries, they 
conclude that this “separation of functions is not a prerequisite to successful oil sector 
development” (Thurber et al. 2011:1). They further find that separation of functions work best 
in countries with high institutional capacity and recommend countries to build capacity before 
separating functions. 
  
Thurber et al. (2011:7-11) also compare the development in the Brazilian petroleum sector to 
the Norwegian model. Brazil was successful in their petroleum management although they 
had a much lower separation of functions than Norway until 1997, when Brazil first created a 
regulatory body separate from the ministry and the NOC (ibid.). The study concludes that 
even though both Norway and Brazil now have the same separation of institutional functions, 
other successful petroleum managers have a different administrative system, so the separation 
of functions is not enough to explain success in Norway and Brazil (Thurber et al. 2011:9). 
    
Large parts of countries’ day-to-day petroleum management take place in the national oil 
companies.  Victor et al. (2012) have edited a large comparative study of NOCs where they 
analyze and explain the variations in performance and strategies of NOCs. Statoil and 
Petrobras come out as two of the best functioning and performing NOCs in the study (Victor 
et al. 2012:898). According to Victor et al. (2012), one of the main reasons for this is that the 
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two companies have few tasks related to non-hydrocarbon services. They are thus allowed to 
concentrate on what they know best and are not directly responsible for funding of welfare 
projects etc., this management is done by other state institutions (ibid.). Two of the chapters 
in the book have concentrated on Petrobras and Statoil respectively, and will be important 
sources of data for this thesis (de Oliveira 2012, Thurber and Istad 2012).  
 
2.4 National factors in Norway and Brazil  
As outlined in the above literature review several national factors have in previous studies 
been found to be positively or negatively related to success in the petroleum sector. This 
section outlines these factors in Norway and Brazil in order to explain the background for 
petroleum resource development in both countries and present differences and similarities 
between the two national contexts. The development of a petroleum sector is long term. This 
thesis has a main emphasis on the current situation in Norway and Brazil, but an important 
part of the analysis investigates how the current success is dependent on developments that go 
back to the start of the sector in the 1950’s in Brazil and in the 1970’s in Norway.  
 
2.4.1 Political factors  
Eifert et al. (2002:25) argue that mature democracies have advantages when it comes to 
making decisions that lead to successful long-term planning and management of oil rents.  
According to Sachs (2007:175-192) an open political system with transparency in income, 
expenses and investments is important for avoidance of the resource curse and success in the 
petroleum sector. A democratic, transparent and stable political system has thus been found to 
be positively related with success in the petroleum sector.  
  
Norway was already a stable and consolidated democracy when oil was found at the end of 
the 1960s. Since then the country has continued to have a well-functioning democratic 
political system. Brazil on the other hand has experienced large political changes. The country 
was democratic at the establishment of a national petroleum sector in the 1950s, but a military 
coup changed this in 1964. After ten years of dictatorship and ten years of transition, 
democracy was re-established in 1985, but political turbulence endured until the mid-1990s. 
Brazil is now considered a relatively well-consolidated democracy.  
 
There are several research institutes that measure the level of democracy and freedom in the 
countries in the world. Many of the annual measurements are however quite new and do not 
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include data from the 1970’s, 1980’s or 1990’s, but the more recent numbers can still 
illustrate the difference between Norway and Brazil on this variable.  
 
The Economist Intelligent Unit2 (EIU) scores the democracy in countries on a scale from 0 to 
10 where 10 is the most democratic. Norway scores 9.55 on this index in 2006 and 9.80 in 
2011. Brazil scores 7.38 on the same scale in 2006 and 7.12 in 2012. On the EIU score for 
risk of social unrest, the score goes from 0 to 10 where 10 is the highest risk of social unrest. 
For 2009/2010 Norway scores 0.4 on underlying vulnerability and 2 on economic distress, 
summing up to a score of 1.2 on risk for social unrest, number 165 of 165 countries. The same 
year Brazil scores 5.8 on underlying vulnerability and 5.0 on economic distress, summing up 
to a score of 5.4 on risk for social unrest, number 105 of 165 countries. 
 
The index of “freedom in the world” from Freedom House3 scores the freedom in countries 
from 1 to 7 where 7 is “not free”. In 1999 Norway scored 1 on this index and in 2013 it also 
scored 1. Brazil scored 3.5 in 1998 and 2 in 2013.  
 
In sum, the political stability and democracy in the period of interest has been very high in 
Norway and quite low in Brazil. A stable democratic regime has without doubt been a great 
advantage to petroleum management in Norway, but given the score on this variable in Brazil, 
success is also possible without this advantage.  
 
2.4.2 Economic factors  
The level of economic development will influence a state’s capacity to manage the petroleum 
sector in an efficient way (Victor et al 2012:18). Larsen (2004) argues that pre-existing 
mature and functioning export industries in areas other than petroleum will be an advantage 
for a state when establishing a petroleum sector. High corruption levels are a weakness for 
economic development, and several scholars see high corruption as a hindrance for successful 
petroleum management, both at the establishment of the sector and in the further development 
and production stages (Al-Kasim et al. 2013, Larsen 2004, Victor et al 2012). In her study of 
the resource curse Karl (1999) argues that an oil rich country with poor economic 
performance is less likely to improve its performance than a poor country without such 
petroleum resources. Low economic development will thus not only be a hindrance to                                                         
2 Data available through URL: http://www.eiu.com/  
3 Data available through URL: http://www.freedomhouse.org/  
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successful management, it will also be worsened by the unsuccessful petroleum management. 
High economic development and low corruption are therefore positively related to successful 
petroleum management (Karl 1999).  
 
There are different ways to measure economic development; in this thesis I measure with 
three indicators that are commonly used for this purpose. As indicators of economic 
development I will use “socio-economic inequality”, “GDP per capita” and “corruption 
level”. The World development indicators (WDI) of the World Bank4 measure inequality with 
the GINI coefficient where 0 is perfect equality and 100 is perfect inequality. Norway’s GINI 
is only measured in 2000, and the score is 25.8. Brazil has more measures and has had a slight 
decrease in inequality from 57.9 in 1981 to 54.7 in 2009, still one of the world’s highest 
socio-economic inequalities. WDI also measures GDP per capita. Norway has a high GDP per 
capita that has grown from 26 010 USD in 1990 to 35 860 USD in 2000 and 98 860 USD in 
2012. Brazil on the other hand started with 2700 USD in 1990, to 3860 USD in 2000 and an 
increase to 11 360 USD in 2012.  
 
Transparency International’s5 corruption perception index scores the corruption in countries 
between 0 and 100 where 100 is very low corruption. In 2012 Norway was the 7th least 
corrupt of 176 countries with a score of 85, and Brazil was number 69 with a score of 43. 
  
The scores on economic development of the two countries are thus very different. 
 
2.4.3 Other factors 
There are however also some similarities between the petroleum sectors in Norway and Brazil 
that may have influenced success. First, both countries have most of their petroleum reserves 
offshore and are dependent on deepwater technology to produce oil and gas. This is normally 
seen as a factor that could make it more difficult to succeed in the petroleum sector 
management since the production is both investment- and knowledge-intensive, and the 
economic and environmental risks are higher than in onshore operations (Lepez 2007). 
Second, the two countries were both producers and exporters in other raw material sectors 
before the petroleum sector was established. This experience can have had a positive 
influence on the building of an organizational culture. However, countries that in many                                                         
4 All data available through URL: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators  
5 Data available through URL: http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/  
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respects have failed to succeed in their petroleum management, such as Nigeria and Bolivia, 
were also traditional exporters of other natural resources before oil and gas was discovered 
(Victor et al. 2012).  
 
2.4.4 National culture  
Culture is often used to explain actions and perceptions, especially in explaining differences 
in performance between groups or countries (Bang 1998:17-19). Norway is a small country 
that has until recently been considered culturally homogeneous, whereas Brazil has the 
world’s fifth largest population and has for centuries been a culturally heterogeneous society. 
It is accordingly easy to understand that the cultural differences between the two countries are 
large.  
 
Culture is however a wide expression that can be used to describe almost anything. The 
iceberg metaphor is therefore useful in order to structure the concept of culture in a 
meaningful way for this thesis. The iceberg model serves to illustrate that only the visible part 
of culture is above the surface, at the top of the iceberg. The majority of cultural aspects are 
however invisible and stored in the large part of the iceberg that is below the surface (Dahl 
2004; Antal and Friedman 2008). Figure 2.1 illustrates the iceberg model.  
  
Figure 2.1 The Iceberg model of culture  
Source: http://www.diploweb.com/Understanding-culture-and-managing.html  
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National culture is the backdrop on which behavior develops and decisions are made. The 
national culture below the water surface in the iceberg model has to do with social norms and 
values that guide behavior and communication. If the national cultures in two countries are 
similar, the background norms, values and assumptions that decisions are made on are similar, 
and the decisions can then also be expected to be similar. For instance would societies with 
high risk aversion be expected to have a lower general acceptance of risky political or 
economic decisions than a society with low risk aversion, and societies with low hierarchy 
would be expected to have a lower general acceptance of top-down decisions than high 
hierarchy societies. When it comes to successful petroleum management, it could be that 
some national cultures to a greater extent than others favor decisions that are positively 
related to success. In order to find out if this is the case for Norway and Brazil, a systematic 
comparison on national cultures is needed. One of the most used and quoted systematizations 
of national norms and values is the national cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede (e.g. 
2001).  
 
Hofstede (2001) presents five dimensions of national culture that can be compared between 
countries. These are based on his extensive studies of the same transnational company in 
many countries. Hofstede (2001) argues that although individuals may differ from the 
national norm, the national culture is present in all parts of society and will be recognizable 
when studying decision making by political institutions, companies or individuals. Since 
countries score differently along these dimensions, Hofstede (2001) says that solutions to 
societal challenges would work differently in the different countries and thus that decisions 
leading to success in one country may not lead to success in another. Hofstede’s (2013) five 
cultural dimensions are power distance, individualism, masculinity/femininity, uncertainty 
avoidance and long-term orientation.  
 
In his analysis of the national cultural dimensions in Norway and Brazil, Hofstede (2013) 
defines the dimensions and finds the following results when giving the countries scores 
between 0 and 100. 
 
Power distance is “the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and 
organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally” 
(Hofstede 2013). Brazil’s score is 69, more than twice as high as Norway’s 31 towards a 
hierarchical culture.   
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Individualism “has to do with whether people’s self-image is defined in terms of “I” or “We”. 
In Individualist societies people are supposed to look after themselves and their direct family 
only. In Collectivist societies people belong to ‘in groups’ that take care of them in exchange 
for loyalty” (Hofstede 2013). Norway scores 69 on this dimension towards an individualistic 
culture, almost the double of Brazil with 38. Brazil’s score is much more collectivistic.  
 
Masculine societies are driven by competition, achievement and being the best, while 
feminine societies appreciate values such as caring for others, having a good life and liking 
what you do (Hofstede 2013). The Norwegian culture is very close to the femininity end of 
the scale on this dimension with a score of 8, while Brazil is much more masculine, about 
mid-way between the two poles with 49.  
 
Uncertainty avoidance is the “extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by 
ambiguous or unknown situations and have created beliefs and institutions that try to avoid 
these” (Hofstede 2013). Brazil scores high on this dimension, meaning that the Brazilian 
culture strongly avoids uncertainty. Norway scores mid-range with 50 and thus has a culture 
with higher acceptance of uncertainty compared to Brazil that scores 76.  
 
Long-term orientation is “the extent to which a society shows a pragmatic future-oriented 
perspective rather than a conventional historical short-term point of view” (Hofstede 2013). 
Norway scores below the middle on this dimension with 44, and has more of a short-term 
culture than Brazil that scores above middle with 65. See an illustration of all the results in 
figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 Hofstede’s (2013) analysis of national cultural dimensions in Norway and Brazil 
 
According to these measures, the differences in national culture between Norway and Brazil 
are quite large. It is therefore unlikely that the national culture in the two countries can 
explain the similar outcome of success in the petroleum sector management in the two 
countries. This information is however important for understanding the environment in which 
the organizational cultures in the petroleum sectors have developed.  
 
2.4.5 Discussion of Hofstede 
Hofstede has been criticized for his methodology since his measures of national culture are 
based on survey and interview data only from the firm IBM. The critics argue that it is 
questionable if findings from studying only one company can be generalized to the whole 
country (Gatley et al. 1996:102). Hofstede defends his method saying that the study of the 
same firm in different countries makes him able to disregard the cultural factors of the 
company and compare the values of otherwise similar persons (same age, gender and 
company position) across countries (ibid.).  
 
In this thesis the scores of Norway and Brazil on Hofstede’s national cultural dimensions will 
be used mainly as background variables, and the critics are thus not directly relevant for the 
analysis. The outline of the national cultural dimensions in Norway and Brazil are however 
useful information for the analysis of organizational cultural traits in the petroleum sectors in 
the two countries.    
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First of all the different scores of Norway and Brazil on the national cultural dimensions serve 
to strengthen the assumption that the organizational cultural traits in the petroleum sector are 
more important for success in this sector than the national cultural factors. Second, the 
national cultural concept of Hofstede gives a good introduction to the concept of culture used 
in this thesis and improves the understanding of the iceberg model since Hofstede’s five 
dimensions are clearly not visible cultural traits in the way flags, food, Christmas traditions 
and music constitute national artifacts and behaviors. Thirdly, the national cultural 
dimensions can enhance the understanding of how the organizational cultural traits within the 
petroleum sectors in Norway and Brazil have developed the way they have. 
 
Critics have argued that Hofstede’s national culture factors are too vague to be applied in 
studies of organizations. According to Gatley et al. (1996:69), these scholars argue that the 
institutional frames that structure organizations can tell more about the national differences 
than the cultural values. However, these institutional frames do not just appear in a vacuum 
without context, and Khalil (1995) makes a good point in arguing that the main attention 
should be given to the practices within the frames, as the frames themselves do not guarantee 
any specific function.  
 
2.5 Institutions and organizations 
As seen in the discussions and outlines above, Norway and Brazil score quite differently 
when it comes to national culture and the political and economic factors that facilitate 
petroleum success. But what about the structures, institutions and organizations within the 
petroleum sector? Maybe is it not a necessity to have a favorable national context if the key to 
success can be found within the petroleum sector? If the actors in the sector are able to 
foresee and handle internal and external challenges, they would also have a much larger 
ability to foresee and handle aspects of the national context that are less favorable to success.  
 
Studies of institutions and organizations appear frequently in economic literature, but there is 
no universal agreement on what these two concepts describe. In order to have a discussion of 
the roles of institutions and organizations, a definition of the two concepts to be used in this 
thesis is therefore needed.  
 
Hodgson (2006:8) discusses the difference between institutions and organizations and define 
organizations within the broader term of institutions: “Organizations are special institutions 
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that involve (a) criteria to establish their boundaries and to distinguish their members from 
nonmembers, (b) principles of sovereignty concerning who is in charge, and (c) chains of 
command delineating responsibilities within the organization” (ibid.).  Hodgson further 
mentions other uses of the term organization in the economic literature, such as using the term 
organization interchangeably with the terms “firm” or “company”, or others that use the term 
organization referring to the national economy. “Organization” is also used interchangeably 
with the term “institution” by some scholars according to Hodgson (2006), while others are 
strongly opposed to mixing these two terms and give them quite distinct definitions (Hodgson 
2006).  
 
Khalil (1995) is one of the latter scholars; he considers institutions and organizations to be 
very different types of entities. According to Khalil institutions are the rules and regulations 
that organizations operate within. He opposes the approach to management that believe 
efficient institutions are the key to success in economies, companies or sectors and argues that 
the tastes and goals of organizations should be studied instead (Khalil 1995:461). “It is an 
illusion to think that the success or failure of organizations is the result of the “correct” mix of 
laws and regulations” (Khalil 1995:462).  
 
Khalil (1995:461) distinguishes between exogenous and endogenous variables and says that 
some success or decline (non-success) can always be explained by exogenous variables. 
However, when it comes to endogenous explanatory factors, the role of organizations is 
important, more important than the rules and regulations that frame their actions.  
 
One institutionalist approach argues that the quality of state institutions influence how the 
petroleum sector is managed and how well the state is able to control the sector and the 
companies working within it. This view is presented by Victor et al. (2012:18-19), who argue 
that the ability to attain goals and reach success within the petroleum sector will be 
particularly difficult for states with weak institutions, as these will easily lose control of the 
sector and unwanted activities such as rent seeking and corruption can emerge. Kolstad and 
Wiig (2008:11) also see institutional capacity as crucial for a distribution of resource rents 
that are beneficial for society.   
 
The definition of institutions used in these arguments of institutional capacity is much more 
comprehensive than Khalil’s (1995) definition. Institutional capacity has to do with actors and 
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actions within and between institutions. Following Khalil (1995) however, action is not taken 
by institutions, but by organizations. Institutions are only the frames within which 
organizations can be capable and successful or not.  
 
In this thesis I argue that institutional capacity is developed through organizational culture. I 
follow Khalil’s (1995) definitions of institutions and organizations and argue that institutional 
structure, as in the rules and division of tasks between the actors in the petroleum sector, are 
the visible characteristics that can be identified at the top of the iceberg. Organizational 
culture, on the other hand, can be observed through traits and indicators, the culture lies on 
the part of the iceberg that is below the water surface and thus not directly observable. 
 
Khalil compares the relationship between institutional frames and organizational culture with 
a theater play: “For a play to be successful, it is insufficient to have a play like Hamlet; there 
is a need for motivated actors and an appreciative audience” (Khalil 1995:461). For this thesis 
this can be translated to the national context in which the petroleum sector operates, and the 
organizational culture within the sector. The favorable national context would then be 
insufficient for success if the organizational culture does not motivate and enhance 
performance in the sector in the adequate way.  
 
Some previous studies have investigated the national oil companies Statoil and Petrobras with 
an aim of analyzing the organizational or corporate culture within the companies. In her 
master thesis, Vilkensen (2006) interviews trainees in Statoil and finds that the trainee 
programs are adequate for creating a common organizational cultural identity between 
employees from different countries. Abreu et al. (2013) have studied how the change in 
Petrobras’ monopoly in the Brazilian petroleum sector changed the corporate culture within 
the company. They found that employees felt a strong commitment to the company, but that 
the commitment was strongest for the ones that had worked the longest in Petrobras, and also 
significantly higher for the ones with a permanent contract compared to time-limited 
contracted personnel. I have not found previous studies with their main focus on the 
organizational culture in the whole petroleum sector in Norway or Brazil, but in her study of 
Middle-Eastern petroleum sectors, Marcel (2006) mentions common cultural traits and values 
as important for a well-functioning relationship between the state and the national oil 
companies.   
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2.6 Organizational cultural traits 
Denison and Mishra (1995) have studied the relationship between organizational culture and 
effectiveness in companies. Their findings have later been confirmed by several studies of 
organizational culture6. Their measure for effectiveness is very similar to my above definition 
of success, they include both economic success such as growth and productivity, and also goal 
attainment, employee satisfaction and stability. Their findings of the relationship between 
organizational culture and effectiveness will therefore be adequate for my analysis of the 
relationship between organizational culture and success in the petroleum sectors in Norway 
and Brazil.  
 
Denison and Mishra (ibid.) find four traits of organizational culture that are positively related 
to success. These are involvement, consistency, adaptability and mission. Denison and Mishra 
(1995:204) find that “involvement and adaptability are indicators of flexibility, openness, and 
responsiveness, and were strong predictors of growth”, while “consistency and mission are 
indicators of integration, direction, and vision, and were better predictors of profitability. 
Each of the four traits was also significant predictors of other effectiveness criteria such as 
quality, employee satisfaction, and over-all performance”. When it comes to the organization-
specific success measures that has to do with attainment of the goals set by the organization, 
Denison and Mishra (ibid.) also found that the “four traits were strong predictors of 
subjectively-rated effectiveness criteria for the total sample of firms”.  
 
The positive relation between these organizational cultural traits and success is also supported 
by other studies (see e.g. Zamanou and Glaser 1994). The traits are defined as follows: 
 
Involvement has to do with how decisions are made. In a high-involvement organization the 
leaders have a high willingness to “include employee contributions in decision making” 
(Zamanou and Glaser 1994:477). This factor is also related to innovation capacity and the 
ability to generate new and profitable ideas within the company (Denison and Mishra 1995).  
 
Consistency is about normative integration; it is “the collective definition of behaviors, 
systems, and meanings in an integrated way that requires individual conformity rather than 
voluntary participation” (Denison and Mishra 1995:214). In strong-consistency organizations                                                         
6 See the webpage http://www.denisonconsulting.com/ for different studies where Denison has made further 
development and use of the model of organizational culture.  
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“the existing managers, executives, and high-status individuals are the agents of socialization, 
and newer lower-status individuals are the subjects” (ibid.).  
 
 Adaptability is “the capacity for internal change in response to external conditions” (Denison 
and Mishra 1995:215).  
 
Mission. A good mission is long-term and combines economic and non-economic objectives. 
“First, a mission provides purpose and meaning, and a host of noneconomic reasons why the 
organization's work is important. Second, a sense of mission defines the appropriate course of 
action for the organization and its members” (Denison and Mishra 1995:216). To keep a long-
term mission for the organization also in changing times is positively related to success.  
 
Some of these four variables can seem to overlap or to be contradictory. Denison and Mishra 
(1995:214) for instance mention that there is a contradiction between involvement and 
consistency since high-involvement organizations will have much room for individuality and 
the conduct of individual actors will be less pre-described by a leader, while in high-
consistency organizations the leaders socialize new actors into more pre-described actions. 
The four traits are therefore set up in a matrix to clarify which challenges they are considered 
best to handle, and the different cultural traits will therefore be important for an organization 
depending on the challenges that emerge.  
 
Table 2.1 Theoretical model of cultural traits  
 Change and flexibility Stability and direction 
External orientation Adaptability Mission 
Internal orientation Involvement Consistency 
Source: Denison and Mishra (1995:216) 
 
In the matrix in figure 3.1 it is shown that adaptability and mission are answers to external 
challenges. A successful organization is able to adapt to external change factors, but without 
losing the most important long-term orientation and missions that identifies the organization’s 
practices. In the same manner involvement and consistency are answers to internal challenges 
where involvement is important in times when innovation, change and new solutions are 
needed, while consistency is important for the organization’s work as a team where all acting 
parties are performing their part of a common project. The following section will outline the 
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conceptual framework for analyzing the relationship between organizational culture and 
success in the petroleum sectors in Norway and Brazil.  
 
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This section starts with an outline of success and how this variable is defined and used in this 
thesis. This is followed by a definition of the concept of organizational culture and why it is 
suitable for a comparative analysis of success in the petroleum sectors in Norway and Brazil. 
Lastly the model of the conceptual framework is presented.  
 
3.1 Success 
In the literature on petroleum resource management, success is referred to and defined in 
different ways depending on the focus of the study. Former studies have established that 
Norway and Brazil are both successful in petroleum management, and the success is often 
referred to as the ability to escape the resource curse and generate resource rent in an efficient 
way (see e.g. Larson 2004, Victor et al. 2012, Thurber et al. 2011). This thesis defines and 
measures the success variable from a holistic perspective based on a set of indicators that are 
comparable across countries and that display the complexity in petroleum sector management. 
 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary success is “the accomplishment of an aim or 
purpose”. When defining success in the management of petroleum resources it is therefore 
reasonable to relate the definition to aims and purposes. Through the literature review three 
different kinds of success factors in the petroleum sector are prevailing. 
 
The first is economic success. In terms of economic aims and perspectives, success is 
resource management that maximizes profit or resource rent through growth and efficiency 
(e.g. Thurber et al. 2011, Mommer 2002).  
 
The second success factor is related to the aim of society’s benefit of the resource. Since the 
natural resources are owned by the people and managed by the state, successful management 
should also include society’s benefit and control of the rents. Literature on the resource curse 
has pointed out that even though the sector is growing, resource rent is generated and the 
economic success is present, other negative factors such as patronage, corruption and 
undermining of democratic control hampers success since the population of the country does 
not benefit from the resource (e.g. Soros 2007:XI, Kolstad et al. 2009, Karl 1999).   
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The third and last success factor connected to aims and purposes is nation specific. Each 
petroleum rich state has its own goals for the petroleum sector. These goals are formulated 
and institutionalized within the cultural context of each country (Mommer 2002). The exact 
goals are therefore difficult to compare across countries. The success in accomplishing goals 
can however be compared. According to Hofstede (2001:408), an organization’s performance 
should be measured against its objectives, and the success variable in this thesis also reflects 
the national success factors and attainment of these.    
 
I will therefore use a set of three types of indicators to operationalize the measure of success 
in the management of petroleum resources in Norway and Brazil. First, the economic success 
factors will be measured as growth in the petroleum sector and resource rent generation. 
Second, success in society’s benefit and control will be measured through the Resource 
Governance Indicators of Revenue Watch (2013) that include institutional and legal setting, 
reporting practices, safeguards and quality control, enabling environment, and NOC 
transparency and accountability. Third, success in accomplishing national goals will be 
measured through the level of attainment of the governments’ main goals in the petroleum 
sector over time. 
 
3.2 Organizational culture 
According to Hofstede (2001:391) “Organizational cultures are the collective programming of 
the mind that distinguish the members of one organization from another”. The petroleum 
sector is large and within the petroleum sectors in Norway and Brazil there are several actors 
and several different departments and sub-units with their own organizational cultures. I 
nevertheless argue that there are shared organizational cultural traits throughout the sectors 
that distinguish the sector from other sectors and actors in society and that can contribute to 
explaining why and how successful management has developed. This holistic view of the 
sector is supported by the fact that the upstream petroleum sector is a quite uniform segment 
with essentially one main task: to produce oil and generate resource rents (Marcel 2006).  
 
Parts of the shared organizational culture can also be negatively related to success, such as 
organizational cultures with widespread corruption or with dogmatic ideas that constrain 
necessary changes. Measuring organizational culture would ideally be done through in-depth 
interviews with all the employees in the state institutions and the NOCs, but this is obviously 
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not possible within the scope of a thesis. Organizational culture will therefore be measured 
through investigating the traits that have been identified as crucial cultural traits shared within 
successful organizations.  
 
Based on the theory of Denison and Mishra (1995), the organizational cultural traits of 
involvement, adaptability, mission and consistency are expected to positively influence a 
successful outcome in petroleum sector management. According to Hatch (2013:163) the 
organizational culture develops in a two-way relationship with its environment. The 
organizational culture is therefore influenced by the national context from which the members 
are recruited, but the organizational culture can also influence the world around it (ibid.). 
Occupational, professional and disciplinal cultures are also important for the development of 
organizational identity (Hatch 2013:163).  
The petroleum sector is large and very complex, and the main hypothesis of this thesis is that 
the combination of the four traits of organizational culture; involvement, adaptability, mission 
and consistency has a positive effect on the success in the sector. Moreover, in accordance 
with Hatch’s (2013) notion of two-way organizational culture development, this thesis sees 
theorganizational culture that is developed in the principal-agent relationship between state 
and NOC in a two-way relation with the organizational culture developed within the NOC.                                                                                                 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Conceptual model 
ORGANIZATIONAL  CULTURE 
Involvement 
  Consistency 
     Mission 
Adaptability 
          SUCCESS 
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Figure 3.1 presents an illustration of the hypothesized relationship between organizational 
culture and successful management in the petroleum sector. The hypothesis will be explored 
through the comparative analysis of the organizational cultures in the petroleum sectors in 
Norway and Brazil.  
 
4.0 METHODS AND RESEARCH DESIGN  
  
4.1 Measuring organizational culture 
Operationalization of variables has to do with the consistency between the definition of a 
variable and how it is measured. All the four abovementioned traits of organizational culture 
are rather abstract and will need to be operationalized in order to define what each variable 
means in the context of this particular study and how it can be measured in order to find the 
abstract value within the empirical data. In other words the operationalization is a 
specification of how I will identify whether these traits are dominant in the petroleum sectors 
in Norway and Brazil. 
 
Most studies of organizational culture are conducted by collecting survey data from the 
employees in the organization. The studies of Denison and Mishra (1995), Zamanou and 
Glaser (1994) and Hofstede’s (2001:395) studies of organizational culture are mainly using 
questionnaire and interview data. This thesis will study the organizational culture of the whole 
petroleum sector in two countries over several years, and a questionnaire survey is therefore 
not useful for collecting the data I need in this study. The operationalization of the variables 
will therefore not be as questions in a questionnaire to measure the aggregate answers of the 
organizations’ members, but indicators to be measures qualitatively through secondary and 
primary data sources. The main data sources will be previous research, official documents and 
analyses, laws, strategies, statistics and former interviews with informants in the sector. 
 
The indicators are divided between the ones that indicate organizational cultural traits in the 
principal-agent relationship and the ones that indicate organizational cultural traits within the 
national oil companies. Since the organizational culture is invisible, as illustrated in the 
iceberg-model, the indicators are the expected visible demonstrations of the cultural traits.  
 
In table 4.1 the four organizational cultural traits involvement, adaptability, mission and 
consistency are operationalized with specific indicators for each trait. 
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Table 4.1 Operationalization of organizational cultural traits in the petroleum sector 
Definition of 
variable 
Operational definition Indicators 
Involvement: The 
organization creates a 
sense of ownership, 
responsibility and 
commitment and the 
leaders have a high 
willingness to “include 
employee 
contributions in 
decision making” 
(Zamanou and Glaser 
1994:477). 
High involvement: The 
decisions-making 
processes are open to all 
relevant actors within the 
petroleum sector and 
professionalism is valued 
higher than hierarchy. 
Actors and employees are 
empowered to make 
autonomous decisions.  
Principal-agent relation:  
1-The division of responsibility between the 
actors  
2- Actors involved in state policy decisions 
3- Communication and mobility between 
actors 
4- Regulations allow the NOC to make 
autonomous decisions  
NOC: 
5- Professionalism versus hierarchy 
6- Internal mobility 
7- Training programs  
8- Innovation and pursuit of new ideas 
Adaptability: It is “the 
capacity for internal 
change in response to 
external conditions” 
(Denison and Mishra 
1995:215) 
High adaptability: The 
ability to adjust structures, 
resources, plans and 
operations according to 
external challenges such 
as changes in the market 
and changes in own 
resources, as well the 
ability to foresee new 
future developments and 
opportunities.  
Principal-agent relation: 
1- Restructuring as a response to change 
2- Investments  
3- Research  
4- Risk aversion 
NOC: 
5- Technological development 
6- Competitiveness 
7- Efficiency  
8- Research and development 
9- Risk aversion 
Mission: “First, a 
mission provides 
purpose and meaning, 
and a host of 
noneconomic reasons 
why the organization's 
work is important. 
Second, a sense of 
mission defines the 
appropriate course of 
action for the 
organization and its 
members” (Denison 
and Mishra 1995:216). 
High mission: All the 
actors in the petroleum 
sector share long-term 
objectives that are kept 
throughout other changes 
in the sector and 
employees are given a 
sense of purpose through 
working together towards 
fulfilling these objectives.  
Principal-agent relation: 
1- Long-term objectives  
2- Both economic and non-economic goals 
NOC: 
3- Overarching strategies and values  
4- Goals and objectives  
Consistency: It is 
about normative 
integration and “the 
collective definition of 
behaviors, systems, 
and meanings in an 
integrated way” 
(Denison and Mishra 
1995:214). 
High consistency: Core 
values lead employees and 
leaders in the petroleum 
sector to make consistent 
decisions and work in a 
coordinated manner to 
reach agreements and 
coordinate their work to 
serve the sector as a 
whole. 
Principal-agent relation: 
1- Clear communication 
2- Clear expectations 
3- Shared values 
NOC: 
4- Integration of values and expectations 
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In order to analyze and compare the organizational cultural traits in the petroleum sectors in 
Norway and Brazil, it is necessary to measure the scores on each trait. Each indicator will be 
measured on an ordinal scale with three levels: low, medium, high. Since the traits are 
abstract concepts, there is a difference in how many indicators that are needed to measure 
each trait. For each case each of the indicators will be given a score according to the 
measurement scales presented in table 4.2, and the aggregate score of each organizational 
cultural trait will be the sum of the indicator scores.  
 
Table 4.2 Measurement of scores on organizational cultural indicators 
Variable Indicator Measurement 
I 
N 
V 
O 
L 
V 
E 
M 
E 
N 
T 
Principal-agent relation:  
1-The division of 
responsibility between the 
actors  
2- Actors involved in state 
policy decisions 
3- Communication and 
mobility between actors 
4- Regulations allow the 
NOC to make 
autonomous decisions 
  
NOC: 
5- Professionalism versus 
hierarchy 
6- Internal mobility 
7- Training programs  
8- Innovation and pursuit 
of new ideas 
1- Clear and mutually respected division of responsibility 
indicated high involvement 
2- Consultation with all the actors in the sector before political 
decisions are made indicates high involvement 
3- Common meeting grounds, frequent communication and 
mobility of staff and leaders between the actors in the sector 
indicate high involvement 
4- It is an indication of high involvement if the NOC can make 
decision based on professional and not political assessments, 
and this autonomy is ensured by regulation  
5- It is an indication of high involvement if professional 
opinion is values higher than positions in decision-making 
6- Mobility within the company where the employees learn 
from each other is an indication of high involvement 
7- Training programs to further develop professional 
knowledge and innovation capacity indicated high involvement 
8- It is an indicator of high involvement if employees with new 
ideas are encouraged and allowed to further develop their ideas 
in the company 
A 
D 
A 
P 
T 
B 
I 
L 
I 
T 
Y 
Principal-agent relation: 
1- Restructuring as a 
response to change 
2- Investments  
3- Research  
4- Risk aversion 
 
NOC: 
5- Technological 
development 
6- Competitiveness 
7- Efficiency  
8- Research and 
development 
9- Risk aversion 
1- It is an indicator of high adaptability if the sector restructures 
when the conditions for the current structure change 
2- It is an indicator of high adaptability if investments are 
prioritized in order to understand and prepare for future 
challenges 
3- It is an indicator of high adaptability if research is prioritized 
in order to understand and prepare for future challenges 
4- Low risk aversion of the government is an indicator of high 
adaptability 
5- It is an indicator of high adaptability if new technologies are 
developed to meet new geological and geographical challenges 
6- It is an indicator of high adaptability if the NOC is 
competitive in relation to other companies in the sector 
7- Focus on efficiency improvement indicates high adaptability 
8- Focus on research and development indicates high 
adaptability 
9- Low risk aversion of the NOC is an indicator of high 
adaptability 
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M 
I 
S 
S 
I 
O 
N 
Principal-agent relation: 
1- Long-term objectives  
2- Both economic and 
non-economic goals 
 
NOC: 
3- Overarching strategies 
and values  
4- Goals and objectives 
1- It is an indicator of high mission if the same long-term goals 
are kept throughout other changes in the sector 
2- That non-economic goals are as important as economic goals 
indicated high mission  
3- That overarching strategies and values are communicated 
and kept in the NOC indicates high mission 
4- It is an indication of high mission if the same goals and 
objectives guide the NOC at different levels and projects 
C 
O 
N 
S 
I 
S 
T 
E 
N 
C 
Y 
Principal-agent relation: 
1- Clear communication 
2- Clear expectations 
3- Shared values 
 
NOC: 
4- Integration of values 
and expectations 
 
1- It is an indication of high consistency that the 
communication between the different actors in the sector is 
open and conflicts of interest are solved before they are allowed 
to grow 
2- It is an indication of high consistency if the expectations 
from the state actors to the NOC are consistent and clearly 
communicated 
3- If values are shared between actors in the sector this 
indicates high consistency 
4- It is an indicator of high consistency if training programs 
give clear instructions to employees of the company’s 
expectations and to what the employees can expect from the 
company. It also indicated high consistency if the company’s 
values are communicated and integrated in all parts of the 
company 
 
In social sciences the quantitative and the qualitative research traditions have often been 
regarded as opposites. However, among others King et al. (1994:3) argue that the two 
traditions have the same logic and the same purpose, but their techniques and styles vary. 
Method is about data collection in order to answer one or more research questions, and the 
best method is therefore an answer to what would be the best way to collect data in order to 
give a valid response to the research question (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008).  
 
Most research in economics use quantitative methods, especially statistics and models for 
effect predictions. Much management research on the other hand, uses a combination of 
quantitative survey methods and qualitative interview data. In the literature of economics and 
management research, qualitative methods are often seen as just one phase of a study meant to 
provide better understanding of an issue before applying quantitative methods, or as a 
provider of a broader understanding of unclear quantitative results (Eriksson and Kovalainen 
2008:5-6). Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008:6) disagree with this perspective and argue that 
qualitative research is an “adequate method for knowledge production, also without any link 
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to quantitative research”. They defend qualitative method as suitable for much research in 
economics and business management.  
 
But qualitative research is not one method; qualitative only means that the method does not 
rely on numerical measurement (King et al. 1994:4). This study of Norway and Brazil is a 
comparative case study. The petroleum sectors in the two countries are the cases that have 
been selected as cases of success in the management of the sector. I am interested in 
explaining this similar success despite the countries’ very different national contexts.  
 
In previous research on petroleum sector management, qualitative methods are often regarded 
as the most fruitful for the design. For instance the abovementioned studies of Victor et al. 
(2012) and Kolstad and Wiig (2008) are mainly based on qualitative research methods since 
the complexity of the petroleum sector and the principal-agent relationship is difficult to 
analyze with quantitative methods.  
 
4.2 Most different cases  
Case studies can be conducted in numerous ways and “should be understood more as a 
research approach or research strategy rather than a method” (Eriksson and Kovalainen 
2008:116). The economist and philosopher John Stuart Mill was one of the first to 
systematize the qualitative comparison of case countries. He divided comparative studies in 
two main models, the method of difference for studying similar case countries with different 
values on the variable of interest (the dependent variable), and the method of agreement for 
studying different case countries with similar values on the dependent variable. The method 
of agreement has later been further developed into the method of most different systems 
design. This method is designed to compare “countries that do not share any common features 
apart from the outcome to be explained and one or two of the explanatory factors seen to be 
important for the outcome” (Landman 2003:29).  
 
The above outline of relevant variables shows that the most different systems design is 
adequate for this comparative study of the petroleum sectors in Norway and Brazil. As shown 
in section 2, the national context factors that have high scores and are often used to explain 
success in the petroleum sector in Norway, score much lower in the Brazilian case and can 
therefore not explain success there in the same way. The political, economic and national 
cultural contexts that influence success have been quite different in the two countries. The 
33  
explanatory factors of organizational culture introduced by management theory are therefore a 
fruitful contribution to the understanding of the similar outcomes. The matrix of the variables 
in the most different system is presented in table 4.3.  
Table 4.3 Most different systems design 
 Norway Brazil 
Explanatory variables   
Political system/Stability A E 
Economic development B F 
National culture C G 
Organizational culture D D 
Dependent variable   
Success in the petroleum sector Y Y 
 
As illustrated in table 3.3, the countries in the most different systems design vary on all the 
explanatory variables apart from the variable of interest. Norway and Brazil have the same 
outcome (Y) on the dependent variable. The two cases vary on three of the four explanatory 
variables, but have similar scores on the fourth variable (D). This supports the hypothesis that 
D has an effect on Y.  
 
King et al. (1994:134-135) argue that the most different systems design has a selection bias 
since the same value on the dependent variables is the selection criteria, and it is difficult to 
demonstrate a causal effect when one will not know whether the explanatory variable is also 
present in cases where the dependent variable has a different value. Collier (1993:106) on the 
other hand argues that cases that “differ in terms of key variables that are the focus of 
analysis” are adequate comparable cases since they allow for concentration on the importance 
of a few variables. He further argues that the determination of adequate cases depend on the 
goal of the analysis (Collier 1993:108).  
 
In accordance with George and Bennett (2005:76), this comparative study is a “building 
block” study that will generate knowledge of the relationship between organizational culture 
and successful management of the petroleum sector that can be used as a building block in 
further studies of the same phenomenon. By comparing most different cases with the same 
outcome, this study identifies an alternative causal path to success (George and Bennett 
2005:76).  
 
34  
This requires an in-dept case study and more than two cases are therefore outside the scope, 
resources and time of this thesis. The finding of this study will have to be applied in a broader 
study of more cases in order to test the causal effect of organizational culture as an 
explanatory variable for success, but the current design is nevertheless adequate to answer the 
exploratory research question of this thesis.  
 
This thesis will be a small contribution to a quite large theory on both petroleum sector and on 
organizational culture. The studies of petroleum sectors have concluded with explanatory 
variables for success in Norway that are not present in Brazil and are thus not universally 
valid explanations. The Brazil case shows that petroleum sector management can succeed 
without high scores on these variables.   
 
4.3 Validity and reliability concerns 
“Validity refers to measuring what we think we are measuring” (King et al. 1994:25). The 
validity of this study is related to its ability to explain the success in management of the 
petroleum sectors in Norway and Brazil. I depend on data from previous studies, official 
documents and statements to get the information needed to answer the research question of 
this study. I thus depend on the quality of these data sources. In order to ensure the validity of 
the data in the case studies I use different sources to confirm the information.  
 
In the search, collection and selection of data material, I have used different kinds of sources. 
I have found quality data in peer-reviewed articles, well-known publications, recent books 
and statistical reports. I have also used primary sources such as speeches, published 
interviews and quotes in order to get information from members of the organizational cultures 
of the petroleum sectors in Norway and Brazil.   
Since the concept of organizational culture is abstract, an adequate operationalization of the 
concept is therefore important in order to have a valid measurement. Through the model and 
the indicators used to measure organizational culture in the petroleum sector in Norway and 
Brazil, I have taken care to include the relevant parts of the concepts derived from the theory 
and developed indicators that in sum operationalizes the concept. Both some of the traits of 
organizational culture and some of the indicators are correlated. This is inevitable since the 
cultural aspects and traits do not have sharp divisions between them. Since I analyze the 
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organizational culture as one concept I do not think that the correlations are a threat to 
validity. 
 
“Reliability means that applying the same procedure in the same way will always produce the 
same measure” (King et al. 1994:25). A possible source of threat to reliability is 
misunderstanding, I have used sources in three different languages; Norwegian, English and 
Portuguese, and even if I understand all languages well, I may have misunderstood something 
since they are not my first language. I have consulted native speakers when I have had 
language doubts in order to diminish this problem. I have also used a copy editor for the thesis 
in order to express myself better in English.   
 
In the search for data material, I found that much of the information I needed could only be 
obtained from the ministries or oil companies that I am studying. I have tried to find other 
sources to confirm their views, but this was difficult in some cases, and there is a chance that 
some of the data is biased in favor of the version that the source writer wants to present. Some 
of the previous studies that have been conducted on organizational culture in the oil 
companies are also classified and I was not able to get insight into all of these. These sources 
may have increased the reliability of this study, but it is difficult to know.  
 
5 CASE STUDIES 
The first part of this section presents the petroleum sectors in Norway and Brazil, measured 
according to the definition of success given in section 3.1. I then move on to the data findings 
that measure organizational cultural traits based on the indicators in section 3.4, this is 
followed by an analysis of organizational culture in each of the two case countries.  
 
5.1 Petroleum success stories 
Success in the petroleum sector is measured through a set of indicators, including three 
success factors; economic success; society’s benefit and control; and attainment of national 
goals in the sector. A short historical review of the success achievements in the two counties 
are outlined below.      
 
5.1.1 Norway 
The idea of possible petroleum reserves outside the coast of Norway first appeared in the 
beginning of the 1960s. In 1963 the Norwegian government proclaimed sovereignty over the 
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Norwegian continental shelf and established that only the government could give concessions 
to search and extraction. In 1969 the large oil field Ekofisk was discovered and oil production 
started there in 1971 (NPD 2013a).  
 
Currently the main actors in the petroleum sector in Norway are the Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy (MPE) representing the government, the regulator called the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and the national oil company Statoil.  
 
a) Economic success 
Growth in the sector 
The income of the Norwegian state from the petroleum reserves has varied over the years, and 
the main income sources have been the petroleum tax, the direct state financial interest 
(SDFI) and royalties. Since the part-privatization of Statoil in 2001, the dividends from the 
company are visible as a separate income-source in the graph in figure 5.1.    
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Net cash flow to the state from petroleum activities  
Source: NPD 2013a figure 3.4, State accounts 
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Resource rent generation 
The sector has created jobs and the resource rents have been used for welfare and social            
security to the population, but taxes have been kept relatively high in order to incentivize 
higher productivity and avoid flooding the economy with rent money (Larsen 2004). A 
pension fund has been created in order to save the resource rents for future generations (NPD 
2010). Currently the market value of the pension fund is 4182 billion Norwegian kroner, 
including an increase of 366 billion Norwegian kroner the first quarter of 2013 (NBIM 2013).  
 
b) Societal benefit and control 
Score on Resource Governance Indicators: 
 
Institutional and legal setting 100 
Reporting practices 97 
Safeguards and quality control 98 
Enabling environment 98 
NOC transparency and accountability 99 
 
The scores are measured from 0 to 100 on each indicator, with 100 being the highest score, 
indicating good-governance. Norway ranks number 1 of a total of 58 resource rich countries 
that have been analyzed by Revenue Watch (2013).  
 
c) Attainment of main national goals over time 
In the beginning the petroleum management sorted under the Ministry of Industry and in 1971 
the Industry Committee of the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) presented what has become 
known as the “10 Oil Commandments”, outlining the goals for the Norwegian petroleum 
sector. These commandments were:  
“1) National supervision and control must be ensured for all operations on the NCS 
(Norwegian continental shelf). 2) Petroleum discoveries must be exploited in a way 
which makes Norway as independent as possible of others for its supplies of crude oil. 
3) New industry will be developed on the basis of petroleum. 4) The development of 
an oil industry must take necessary account of existing industrial activities and the 
protection of nature and the environment. 5) Flaring of exploitable gas on the NCS 
must not be accepted except during brief periods of testing. 6) Petroleum from the 
NCS must as a general rule be landed in Norway, except in those cases where socio-
political considerations dictate a different solution. 7) The state must become involved 
at all appropriate levels and contribute to a coordination of Norwegian interests in 
Norway’s petroleum industry as well as the creation of an integrated oil community 
which sets its sights both nationally and internationally. 8) A state oil company will be 
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established which can look after the government’s commercial interests and pursue 
appropriate collaboration with domestic and foreign oil interests. 9) A pattern of 
activities must be selected north of the 62nd parallel which reflects the special socio-
political conditions prevailing in that part of the country. 10) Large Norwegian 
petroleum discoveries could present new tasks for Norway’s foreign policy.” (NPD 
2010)  
 
In 1972 the Norwegian parliament created the regulating Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and 
the NOC Statoil to fulfill the first goal of supervision and control of NCS. The Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy was established in 1978 (NPD 2010). The self-sufficiency goal was 
attained soon after oil production started and around 200 000 people now work in this new 
industry in Norway (NPD 2010, Lund 2012). Even though there have been some changes in 
other productive industries and the current high oil prices put a pressure on Norwegian non-
oil exports, the macroeconomic situation with oil income has led to a sound economic 
development in Norway, also in times when neighboring countries have not had the same 
opportunity to implement counter-cyclical economic policies (NPD 2010). There is however 
an increasing conflict between the petroleum interests and the environmental, and especially 
climate interests in Norway, but the Norwegian oil production is considered to be cleaner and 
stronger environmentally regulated than similar production in other countries and the 
regulation against gas flaring has been fulfilled (ibid.).  
 
Landing oil in Norway was difficult to fulfill, but improved technology has fulfilled this goal 
since the first pipelines to Norwegian harbors in the 1980s. According to NPD (2010) the last 
four commandments have also been fulfilled through the creation of Statoil and the 
emergence of Norway as an important oil exporter, linking the sector to other national 
interests and foreign policy.  
 
5.1.2 Brazil 
In 1938 the Brazilian government established a national petroleum council to gain control 
over the country’s petroleum reserves. In 1953 the state oil company Petrobras was created 
with monopoly rights to oil and gas exploration and production in Brazil. Much of Brazil’s 
petroleum history evolves around and within this company (Fishman 2010). It is difficult to 
separate the developments in the Brazilian petroleum sector from the developments in 
Petrobras. The first logo of Petrobras was rhombus shaped with the name of the company in 
blue on a yellow and green background, a direct link to the Brazilian flag (Petrobras 2013). 
Currently the main actors in the petroleum sector in Brazil are the Ministry of Mines and 
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Energy (MME) representing the government, the regulator called the National Agency of 
Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuel (ANP) and the national oil company Petrobras.  
 
a) Economic success 
Growth in the sector 
According to the American Energy Information Administration (EIA), Brazil has now 
surpassed Venezuela as South America’s largest liquid fuels producer (EIA 2012). The past 
decade has brought increasing living standards to millions of Brazilians, so the oil 
consumption is increase alongside the production, but the new pre-salt offshore fields are 
expected to increase petroleum exports more than consumption towards 2020, as illustrated in 
figure 5.2 below.  
 
Figure 5.2 Brazil’s liquid fuel production 2003-2013 
Source: http://www.eia.gov/cabs/brazil/Full.html  
 
 
Resource rent generation 
The income from the royalties in the petroleum sector has increased from just above 2 million 
BRL in 2001 to 13 million BRL in 2011 (IPB 2013).  
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b) Societal benefit and control 
Score on Resource Governance Indicators: 
 
Institutional and legal setting 81 
Reporting practices 78 
Safeguards and quality control 96 
Enabling environment 66 
NOC transparency and accountability 92 
 
The scores are measured from 0 to 100 on each indicator, with 100 being the highest score, 
indicating good-governance. Brazil ranks number 5 of a total of 58 resource rich countries 
that have been analyzed by Revenue Watch (2013). All the countries that score better than 
Brazil are OECD countries. Brazil also scores better than one OECD country; Canada.  
 
c) Attainment of main national goals over time 
Self-sufficiency in energy resources has been the main target of the Brazilian petroleum 
sector since the 1950’s (Rodriguez and Suslick 2009:8). This self-sufficiency was linked to 
the goal of economic growth through industrialization, where reliable and affordable energy 
played a key role (Sennes and Narciso 2009:27). Both the available oil reserves and the 
production of oil in Brazil have grown considerably the past 10 to 15 years, and in 2006 
Brazil attained an oil surplus for the first time, exporting more oil than it imported (Sennes 
and Narciso 2009:32-33).  
 
Table 5.1 Summary of success variable 
 Success factor Result 
Norway Economic  Success 
Society’s benefit and control Success 
National goals Success 
Brazil Economic  Success 
Society’s benefit and control Success 
National goals Success 
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5.2 Cultural factors 
This section presents the results of the investigation of organizational culture in the petroleum 
sectors in Norway and Brazil 
 
5.2.1 Norway 
a) Involvement  
Principal-agent relation:  
1-The division of responsibility between the actors  
Thurber et al. (2010:7) refers to three distinct government bodies in the administrate design of 
the petroleum resources in Norway. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy  (MPE) together 
with the country’s political leadership set the goals of the sector. Statoil (NOC) that has the 
responsibility on commercial activities with an extensive participation in the country and 
abroad. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) collects fees from the operations of the 
sector. These three state controlled institutions with their responsibilities and different roles in 
the sector are known as the “Norwegian Model” of oil sector governance (Thurber et al. 
2010).  
 
The Secretary General of MPE, Elisabeth Berge, has worked for both the ministry and Statoil 
before and after the part-privatization in 2001, and she says the roles and division of 
responsibilities between the actors have become clearer after the part-privatization 
(Offshore.no 2009b). According to the current Norwegian Minister of Oil and Energy “Statoil 
is treated like any other company on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. They have no 
preferential treatment on the NCS. They apply and compete for licenses and they pay taxes 
like all other companies” (Moe 2013:5-7). The division of tasks between the main actors in 
the sector is thus clear and mutually respected.  
 
2- Actors involved in state policy decisions 
The Parliament takes the decisions regarding opening of new areas on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf for petroleum activities (Moe 2013:3-7). The MPE awards production 
licenses and approves plans for development, installations and operations of oil and gas fields. 
The government also approves the decommissioning plans if there are impact assessments and 
public consultation (ibid.). 
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According to Boasson (2004:25) the decision-making in the Norwegian petroleum sector has 
been done in close dialogue between the MPE, NPD and Statoil since the establishment of 
MPE in 1978. Before new policy decisions are made, economic studies of the policy impact 
on society and wealth are conducted on behalf of MPE (Thurber and Istad 2012:600-601). 
The administrative leadership of MPE has been strong and consistent with few changes 
between shifting governments. This leadership makes policy decisions in close cooperation or 
negotiation with Statoil and other operating companies (Boasson 2004:37-38).  
 
3- Communication and mobility between actors 
The MPE manages the state’s shareholder responsibility in Statoil and is active in meetings 
with the NOC (Moe 2013:6-7). MPE “follows up deliveries in strategy, final and operational 
results and dividend. There are quarterly one to one meetings with Statoil management. The 
Ministry is represented in the nomination committee, which proposes members to the non-
executive board and the corporate assembly” (Moe 2013:6-7). Statoil is also responsible for 
informing the government about market and technical issues so the government can make 
informed decisions about depletion and price (Marcel 2006: 87-88).  
 
There is a relatively high mobility between MPE, NPD and Statoil. Many of the leaders in 
each institution have been employed in the same institution for many years, but the majority 
also has experience from other parts of the sector in Norway. For instance has the director of 
NPD worked as a geologist in Statoil and the secretary general of MPE started her career in 
the ministry, but has also worked 14 years in Statoil (NPD 2013b, MPE 2012). There has 
traditionally also been close ties between the Norwegian political parties and the Statoil 
leadership, the current CEO of Statoil has worked as political advisor for the Conservative 
party in the Parliament (Statoil 2008). The close dialogue between the actors result in many 
formal and informal meeting grounds and it is fairly normal to change employer to another 
actor within the sector (NPD 2013b, Offshore.no 2009b) 
 
4- NOCs allowance to make autonomous decisions  
Thurber and Istad (2010) argue that Statoil has had much freedom to make autonomous 
decisions and prioritize long-term goals without political interventions. After the 
establishment of MPE in 1978, the Ministry had much direct influence on Statoil’s priorities, 
but throughout the 1980’s when Statoil started to make a considerable income, the company 
gained autonomy (Ryggvik 2010:41) Today Statoil operates as a private company with the 
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state as majority shareholder, and since the part-privatization in 2001, the government has still 
suggested and voted on board member, but then mainly trusted the board to make autonomous 
decisions (Ryggvik 2010, Thurber and Istad 2010).  
 
However, Norwegian politicians and civil society organizations often have opinions on 
Statoil’s decisions and activities, and feel they should have a say in the company’s 
development since they see it as “Norwegian property” (Thurber and Istad 2012:603). Both 
politicians and public campaigns have stressed the need for a more active ownership by MPE, 
particularly on controversial issues such as tar-sand developments in Canada and investments 
in countries with dictatorial regimes, but MPE has so far not intervened in these NOC 
decisions (ibid.). According to Pargendler et al. (2013:25) among NOCs “Statoil is a unique 
case in which the board is composed by a majority of external members who are relatively 
independent form the government”. 
 
NOC: 
5- Professionalism versus hierarchy 
Statoil has since the start had a strong engineering orientation, prioritizing technological 
developments over short-term income, creating technological breakthroughs and larger 
income in the long run (Thurber and Istand 2010). Three of the eleven members of Statoil’s 
board are employee representatives (Statoil 2013c), indicating a strong emphasis on including 
the whole company in decision making processes.  
 
6- Internal mobility 
In their own presentation Statoil emphasizes the possibility for internal mobility in the 
company and also the large possibilities for working in different areas within the Statoil 
system; both onshore and offshore, in Norway and abroad, in different parts of Norway and in 
different kinds of projects (Statoil 2013d). There is also internal mobility built into some of 
the permanent work contracts for professional in Statoil, there is for instance a limit of two 
years offshore work before an engineer has to return to an onshore job for two years. This is 
because most of the development and innovation is done onshore, and the company does not 
want employees to lose contact with this part of the job (personal communication with Statoil 
engineer).  
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7- Training programs  
Statoil has extensive trainee programs for new employees where they are able to build 
competence within one area but also gain knowledge of the other different areas Statoil works 
in (Vilkensen 2006:14). The “Statoil academy” offers training programs for all employees, 
through this program, employees increase their mobility in the company and are allowed to 
further develop the knowledge and competence they already have (Statoil 2013d).  
 
8- Innovation and pursuit of new ideas 
Statoil has been active in searching for new ideas both within and outside the company, 
especially the last couple of years. The company has programs, and now webpages, where 
they announce new challenges and ask for suggested solutions from companies, technological 
entrepreneurs and research environments. The further development of the projects can then be 
co-financed by Statoil in venture contracts or with other kinds of development assistance. 
This is also done within the company with a forum for innovation and new developments 
(Teknisk Ukeblad 2011, Offshore.no 2011). 
 
b) Adaptability 
Principal-agent relation: 
1- Restructuring as a response to change 
In the beginning of the 1980’s Statoil expanded rapidly at the same time as the company 
directly managed the state’s investments. The government thought this gave too much power 
to the NOC and wanted to stimulate more competition in the Norwegian petroleum sector. In 
1984 the state’s direct financial interest in the petroleum sector (SDFI) was separated from 
Statoil in the so-called “Statoil compromise”, this also allowed Statoil to use its remaining 
profit more freely and invest in downstream broad (Gordon and Stenvoll 2007:12 and 27, 
Nordeng 2008). 
 
The fall in oil prices in 1985-86 had macroeconomic consequences for Norway. The 
petroleum tax income to the state was close to zero (see figure 5.1) and the trade balance that 
had for many years been positive, turned negative from one year to the next (Andersen and 
Austvik 2000).  The unemployment grew and the loss of petroleum income to the state was 
difficult to recover from other sectors. However, the state kept financing new investments 
despite economic losses, new concessions were granted and Statoil made considerable efforts 
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to improve efficiency in exploration and production as well as investing in new technology 
and development (Boasson 2004:26, Andersen and Austvik 2000).  
 
Towards the end of the 1990’s it was clear that the oil production on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf would soon reach a peak and start diminishing since the production in the 
large fields were approaching or past their peak (Nordeng 2008:32). In order to give Statoil 
increased freedom to pursue investments abroad and to diminish the state’s direct risk through 
direct ownership, the Storting decided to part-privatize Statoil in 2001, keeping 70,9% of the 
shares under MPE’s administration (ibid.).  
 
2- Investments  
During the periods of low oil prices in the 1980’s, the state kept investing in the domestic oil 
sector (Andersen and Austvik 2000). Secretary General in MPE, Elisabeth Berge says the 
separation of Statoil and SDFI probably was a great advantage for the Norwegian petroleum 
sector when the oil prices fell drastically in 1986. SDFI could invest without constraint, 
something that would have been difficult if Statoil would still have been the only investor 
(Offshore.no 2009b). Figure 4.1 also shows a negative income for SDFI in the mid-1980’s, 
confirming Berge’s point of view.  
 
The relative financial autonomy of Statoil also allows the company to set outside founds to 
invest in long term projects, such as research and development or exploration (Pargendler et 
al. 2013:28). 
 
3- Research  
In the beginning of petroleum production in Norway, the government emphasized the need to 
build knowledge and research within Norway. The international companies that were grated 
concessions in cooperation with Statoil were given “goodwill points” for involving 
Norwegian professionals, researchers and supply companies in their work (Sæther et al. 
2011).  
 
MPE invests in research on petroleum and energy through giving funding to special research 
programs in the Norwegian Research Council. This is research within many different 
disciplines, such as economy, engineering, chemistry, political science and different fields of 
technology development (MPE 2013).   
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Through Statoil the state has also invested in carbon capture and storage research and in 
offshore wind projects. These projects have so far not been very successful, but both the 
government and the companies involved argue that the investments are research and 
development investments in a long-term perspective (Offshore.no 2009b).   
 
4- Risk aversion 
Apart from the Statfjord field, few large fields were discovered on the Norwegian continental 
shelf in the 1970’s. The young Ministry of Petroleum and Energy then decided to open many 
new areas for exploration and large concessions were given in 1979, including the still 
producing fields Oseberg, Troll, Gullfaks and Snorre (Offshore.no 2009a). Much of the 
economic risk was however transferred to the foreign investors that were partnering with 
Statoil in the exploration and production.  
 
According to Pargendler et al. (2013) the model of mixed ownership after the part-
privatization of Statoil has allowed the government to investment in new and riskier projects 
with a longer term perspective, since the government can now share risk over uncertain 
ventures with private investors. 
 
NOC: 
5- Technological development 
In the 1970’s Statoil worked alongside IOCs at the Norwegian Continental Shelf in order to 
learn as much as possible about exploration and production from the foreign companies. The 
state gave Statoil financial security to pursue new ideas of innovation and technology, 
resulting in rapid and ground-breaking technological development (Thurber and Istad 
2012:629-637). IOCs are also obliged to use Norwegian technology and have local content in 
their projects on the NCS (Mendonça 2012:4).  
 
6- Competitiveness 
Following the part-privatization in 2001, Statoil started to extensively expand its international 
programs and investments abroad (Gordon and Stenvall 2007:33). The developments in 
Norway had slowed down, the company wanted to improve competitiveness and the 
government agreed with the NOC’s suggestion to change the ownership structure to attract 
private capital and enable expansion (ibid.). Since the large fields on the NCS were becoming 
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less productive, and the oil production in Norway was expected to decline, Statoil needed to 
expand abroad in order to continue company growth (Lund 2012).  
 
From the 1970’s Statoil had competition from two other Norwegian companies, the private 
Saga Petroleum and the part-state owned Norsk Hydro7. Statoil had the advantages of a NOC, 
but also had to compete with the other two companies for the best talents and innovation 
development on the NCS (St.meld. 2011).  
 
In 2007, Statoil merged with the oil and gas branch of Norsk Hydro, this also increased the 
competitiveness of the company (Lund 2012). According to Thurber and Istad (2012:603) the 
two companies lobbied the Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg directly in order to secure the 
government’s acceptance of the merger.  
 
In order to adapt to a more competitive international environment, Statoil expanded its 
activities to unconventional upstream oil and gas after the merger with Norsk Hydro. At the 
same time the company split the downstream fuel and retail division into a separate entity, 
and all Statoil’s shares in this entity was sold in 2012 to emphasize the company’s focus on 
upstream (Statoil 2012a).  
 
7- Efficiency  
Since Statoil was the preferred company with guaranteed parts in all concessions on the NCS, 
the efficiency of the company was not thoroughly challenged and Statoil tented to perform 
less efficiently than its main competitor Norsk Hydro prior to the part-privatization (Thurber 
and Istad 2012:635). With the exposure to international competition and investments abroad, 
Statoil improved its efficiency relative to other companies on the NCS (ibid.).  
 
8- Research and development 
According to Statoil (2011), the company has a comprehensive research and development 
activity, focusing on areas that will contribute to fulfilling the ambition of becoming a 
stronger and internationally more competitive company.  
 
                                                        
7 Saga Petroleum and Norsk Hydro merged in 1999 after Norsk Hydro had bought most of Saga’s shares.  
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Statoil has been a leader in offshore technology and recovery of oil from older fields, this 
technology development is continuing and has given the company some advantages in 
international competition (Thurber and Istad 2012:636-637, Statoil 2011).  
 
Statoil has also engaged in several bilateral research cooperation projects with universities 
and research institutes in Norway. These are focusing on technological innovation, 
infrastructure development, basic science and research, and co-financing of PhD programs 
and research projects (Johansen et al. 2009:12-13).  
 
9- Risk aversion 
In the start of the petroleum development in Norway, Statoil had 50% participation in all 
fields and the rest was contracted to a foreign company that had to take all the risk in the 
project, in this way the risk for both the state and the NOC was minimized (Gordon and 
Stensvoll 2007:32). Since the part-privatization in 2001, Statoil competes on equal grounds 
with other companies for concessions in Norway, and also has to bear the same risk. Some of 
Statoil’s investments in projects abroad have been quite risky, and the company has still 
invested to gain both resource rents and experience. According to the current CEO, Helge 
Lund (2012), industrial development has inhered many risks for Statoil and some losses have 
been caused through risk taking, without the willingness to take risks in projects and 
technology development however, Statoil would not have achieved all that it has achieved.  
 
According to Thurber and Istad (2012: 636), Statoil’s initial mandate included developing the 
Norwegian petroleum knowledge, with technological explorations, high employment and high 
oil and gas recovery from the fields. This led to less focus on the bottom line in the first 
decades of Statoil’s operations than what was usual in other companies such as Norsk Hydro 
(ibid.).  
 
c) Mission 
Principal-agent relation: 
1- Long-term objectives  
The overarching mission for the Norwegian petroleum sector for the past 50 years has been 
that “Norway’s petroleum resources belong to the Norwegian people, and they must be 
managed in a way that benefits the entire Norwegian society” (St.meld. 2011). This goal is 
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still the first goal highlighted by MPE in the White Paper on the petroleum sector to the 
Parliament in 2011 (St.meld. 2011). The “ten oil commandments” of the Parliament from 
1971 are still incorporated in national strategies for the petroleum sector, so the same 
overarching goals have been kept throughout the forty years of the sector (St.meld. 2011). 
 
2- Both economic and non-economic goals 
According to Thurber and Istad (2010) the Norwegian petroleum policy was from the start in 
the early 1970s more focused on maintaining state control over the petroleum sector than on 
maximizing revenue. The “ten oil commandments” are also a mixture of economic and non-
economic goals; national control, Norwegian content, environmental concern and self-
sufficiency are among the non-economic long-term goals (NPE 2010).  
 
NOC: 
3- Overarching strategies and values  
The overarching vision of Statoil is “crossing energy frontiers” (Statoil 2013b). The new 
investments in unconventional tar sands and shale gas and CCS developments are the new 
frontiers in order to fulfill the vision. The vision is supported by four core values: 
“courageous, open, hands-on and caring” (Statoil 2013c). Being the best in their area of 
expertise, such as offshore drilling, health and safety regulations and high degrees of 
extraction from fields have been goals that Statoil has kept through the years of other changes. 
This strategy is still important for Statoil and in incorporated in new corporate plans (Statoil 
2012b).  
 
4- Goals and objectives 
One of Statoil’s main goals has since the start been to ensure maximum value creation on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf (annual report 2012). The objective is formulated as a goal to 
cover the need for energy in order to ensure continued economic and social development, at 
the same time as the company behaves responsibly and makes an effort to mitigate global 
climate change (Statoil 2013a). Since the reserves on the NCS are declining it is also a clear 
goal for Statoil to expand abroad (Nordeng 2008:37). 
 
d) Consistency 
Principal-agent relation: 
1- Clear communication 
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In the beginning of petroleum development in Norway the communication between Statoil 
and the politicians was very strong. The first CEO of Statoil, Arve Johnsen, was a former 
state secretary for the Labour Party and had strong ties to many politicians in the parliament 
(Ryggvik 2010:27-33). With the creation of the MPE, the communication between the actors 
in the sector formalized more, as Statoil also developed a clearer corporate identity (Thurber 
and Istad 2012:602).   
 
According to Secretary General in MPE, former Statoil employee Elisabeth Berge, the 
ministry represents knowledge and continuity in the petroleum sector and the communication 
between the ministry and the other actors in the sector is good and frequent (Offshore.no 
2009b).  
 
2- Clear expectations 
According to Statoil CEO Helge Lund (2012), the development in the Norwegian petroleum 
sector has been characterized by a clear division of tasks between the different actors in the 
sector and clear expectations from the owner interests in the state to Statoil’s role as a rent 
generator.  
 
In the 1980’s there was however controversies and politicians said Statoil had too much 
power in the Parliament (Thurber and Istad 2012:620). This was changed through the 
establishment of SDFI, and the Parliament’s expectation to Statoil became clearer after this 
separation of Statoil and the state’s direct financial interest (ibid.).  
 
3- Shared values  
Maximizing the benefit on the Norwegian Continental Shelf and ensuring the Norwegian 
population best possible profit from their resources has been the shared goal of all the actors 
in the Norwegian petroleum sector (Thurber and Istad 2012). The development of Norwegian 
professional resources, national industry and excellence in offshore production has also been 
shared visions of the Parliament, MPE, NPD and Statoil (Ryggvik 2010, Thurber and Istad 
2012, St.meld. 2011, Riis-Johansen 2010).   
 
NOC: 
4- Integration of values and expectations 
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Statoil says they have a value-based performance culture. The four core values of Statoil are 
“courageous, open, hands-on and caring” (Statoil 2013c). Statoil has an introduction program 
for all new employees and special programs for leaders and leadership training. All new in the 
company are trained and followed-up in programs called “you’re one of us” and 
“people@statoil” (Statoil 2013c). It is clear from the introduction to the values and from the 
career-model for more experienced personnel that Statoil expects the employees to integrate 
the core values in their work, but at the same time be innovative and maximize their own 
potential and performance (Statoil 2013c). The same values are communicated and integrated 
through programs for newcomers, experienced staff and leaders.  
Through the network of institutions and professional in the Statoil academy, the continuity in 
knowledge-creation and passing on and integration of knowledge in the company is promoted 
(Statoil 2013d). 
 
Table 5.2 Organizational culture Norway - Summary table  
Cultural trait Indicator score Total score 
Involvement in the principal- 
agent relationship 
1. high 
2. high 
3. high 
4. medium/high 
- Both the Norwegian 
petroleum sector as a whole 
and Statoil score high on the 
involvement indicators 
Involvement in Statoil 
 
5. high 
6. high 
7. high 
8. high 
Adaptability in the principal-
agent relationship 
1. high 
2. high 
3. high 
4. medium 
- The Norwegian petroleum 
sector scores high on three of 
four adaptability indicators, 
only risk aversion indicated 
medium adaptability 
- Statoil scores medium to 
high on adaptability, the 
medium score is on risk 
aversion, and medium to 
high on efficiency focus 
Adaptability in Statoil 5. high 
6. high 
7. medium/high 
8. high 
9. medium 
Mission in the principal- 
agent relationship 
1. high 
2. high 
- Both the Norwegian 
petroleum sector as a whole 
and Statoil score high on the 
mission indicators 
Mission in Statoil 3. high 
4. high 
Consistency in the principal- 
agent relationship 
1. high 
2. medium/high 
3. high 
- Both the Norwegian 
petroleum sector as a whole 
and Statoil score relatively 
high on the consistency 
indicators 
Consistency in Statoil 4. high 
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5.2.2 Organizational culture in the Norwegian petroleum sector 
The organizational culture in the Norwegian petroleum sector scores high on mission. This is 
in contrast to country’s score on the long-term orientation factor of national culture, where the 
Norwegian society scores relatively low. This can be explained by the fact the political 
system and the economy in Norway were stable and well-functioning when petroleum was 
found, so the petroleum came on the top of an established welfare system.  
 
The overarching goals of the Norwegian petroleum sector from the start were to develop the 
sector to the benefit of the people and to be cautious in analyzing the sector’s impact on the 
already functioning welfare economy. This created a high mission-lead culture within the 
sector; the principal-agent relationship is founded on the common understanding of the 
mission. The mission-orientation also led the sector to develop a high involvement culture.  
 
In accordance with the mission culture it was important to build a Norwegian knowledge base 
to ensure that the best interest of the Norwegian people would be prioritized. To develop the 
sector properly and avoid known pitfalls, a close relationship between the governments and 
the agent was necessary, and all relevant actors were involved in decision-making. The 
mandate given to Statoil through the overarching mission also generated high involvement in 
the company since the petroleum research and development environments in Norway were 
built up alongside the growth of Statoil, and new innovative and technological personnel were 
often needed to fulfill the increasing tasks of the company.  
 
The cultural trait of involvement is related to internal challenges and decision-making. Since 
all the actors in the Norwegian petroleum sector were new and the mobility between them 
was relatively high, the culture that was built within and between the actors was also high in 
consistency. It became important to build a strong sector identity, and a strong Statoil identity 
that were consistent and directed towards fulfilling the goals and challenges of the young 
sector.  
 
The organizational cultural values of high involvement and high adaptability are in line with 
the scores of Norway on national cultural dimensions of low risk aversion and low hierarchy. 
Much of the risk in the Norwegian petroleum development was however shifted to 
international companies investing in the sector. The high adaptability culture combined with 
high mission made the managers in the sector able to adapt to shifts in the international 
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market and in the Norwegian reserve situation at the same time as decisions were made to 
invest and develop the sector in line with the overarching goals.  
 
Through the state’s financial back-up Statoil further developed its adaptability and was in the 
beginning able to meet external challenges without having to take the cost of the inherent 
risks and losses of efficiency. To new professional talents Statoil was an interesting place to 
work since the room for individual development was high. With higher competition in the 
sector, the state chose to adapt to this through part-privatization of Statoil. The combination of 
adaptability and consistency in Statoil’s organizational culture allowed Statoil to keep a high 
company identity while expanding abroad, innovating in new areas and attracting cooperation 
partners both in Norway and abroad.  
 
5.2.3 Brazil 
a) Involvement  
Principal-agent relation:  
1-The division of responsibility between the actors  
Until 1997 the Brazilian petroleum sector had two actors; the Ministry of Energy and Mines 
and the NOC Petrobras. From 1997 the ANP was established as a regulatory agent and the 
National Energetic Policy Council (CNPE) was established as an energy policy advising 
council to the government. The regulatory responsibility that used to belong to Petrobras was 
moved to ANP (Rodriguez and Suslick 2009:11). The ANP and Petrobras are the two actors 
that are responsible for implementing and carrying out the Brazilian policies for the whole oil 
and gas supply chain (Prochnik 2011:2). With the establishment of ANP Petrobras was 
relieved of social and political burdens outside the upstream exploration and production and 
the division of responsibilities between the actors in the sector became clearer (Victor et al. 
2012:900-903). According to de Oliveira (2012:524) it has been important for all actors to 
keep Petrobras’ responsibility strictly to the tasks of an oil company, not giving the company 
other socio-economic missions.  Petrobras has throughout its history had significant control 
over its allocated resources and been protected from political interventions (Thurber and Hults 
2012). The Brazilian Petroleum Law that was renewed in 1997 is very clear and detailed in 
dividing responsibilities between MME, ANP and Petrobras (Brazil Gov. 1997). The division 
of responsibilities is thus clear and well respected by all involved parties. 
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2- Actors involved in state policy decisions 
Since the creation of Petrobras in 1954, the communication and cooperation between the 
company and the government has been close, when state agencies or political parties have 
demanded changes in the Brazilian petroleum sector, the government has in most cases 
supported Petrobras’ opinion in policies that would affect the NOC (de Oliveira 2012:523-
526). However, the various governments during the military regime period often made policy 
decisions without consulting involved actors, this also happened in the petroleum sector, 
sometimes, but not always, resulting in inefficient decisions (Guan 2012:5, de Oliveria 
2012:528) The energy policy advisory council CNPE created in 1997 consists of 
representatives from different ministries, one civil society and one university representative 
and this council advises MME on energy policy matters (MME 2013). CNPE’s main task is to 
maintain national interests within the different energy sectors, and expert advice from relevant 
stakeholders is often sought in order to develop informed and implementable policies in the 
petroleum sector, and public hearings open to all stakeholders are held by ANP before new 
policy decisions, concession regulations and bidding rounds are made (MME 2013, ANP 
2011). The different actors’ inclusion in the policy decision making process has varied 
between the political regimes, but during the democratic regimes in the 1990’s and 2000’s, 
the involvement of all relevant actors in state policy decision making has been relatively high.  
 
3- Communication and mobility between actors 
The personal links between the government, the MME and Petrobras are strong. The CEO of 
Petrobras is appointed by the government and the current CEO, Maria Foster has previously 
worked for MME during the current Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff’s tenure as Minister 
of Mines and Energy from 2003 to 2005 (Petrobras Magazine 2013). Before she was 
appointed the minister post, Rousseff was the head of Petrobras’ board of directors. The high 
mobility between the Brazilian political leadership and the leadership of Petrobras is not new 
(de Oliveira 2012), and according to Cowley and Magalhaes (2013), analysts see an increase 
in political interest and influence in Petrobras since the beginning of the 2000’s, both the 
formal and the informal communication seems to be high, but Petrobras still keep a high focus 
on professionalism in economic and technical decisions.  
 
4- NOCs allowance to make autonomous decisions  
When it comes to actions, strategies and decision-making, Petrobras has “reasonable 
autonomy” in relation to both the MME and ANP according to Sennes and Narciso (2009:40). 
55  
Fishman (2010:5) also argues that Petrobras has had “managerial and political independence 
from the national government”. When the military regime appointed General Geisel to lead 
Petrobras in 1968, Geisel made it explicit that MME could not interfere in Petrobras’ decision 
making. However, when Geisel himself became president of Brazil in 1974, he decided that 
Petrobras had to cooperate with international oil companies to explore the newly found 
Brazilian offshore oil fields; this was implemented even if Petrobras was against the idea (de 
Oliveira 2012:525-528). Petrobras’ allowance to make autonomous decisions has thus varied, 
but it has mainly been relatively high and currently the autonomy is high.  
 
NOC: 
5- Professionalism versus hierarchy 
Petrobras has from the start been focused on attracting skilled employees, especially 
professionals within technology, geology and chemical engineering (de Oliveira 2012:523). 
The board of directors of Petrobras has one member that represents the employees (Petrobras 
2013). This indicates involvement of employees at all levels of the company. Petrobras was 
created before Brazil had discovered large oil reserves, and the need to develop professional 
skills and include technical expertise in decision-making has therefore been necessary to the 
performance and growth of the company (de Oliveira 2012).  
 
6- Internal mobility 
Petrobras has a strong national identity and hires mainly Brazilian employees, the internal 
mobility possibilities for employees in Petrobras is higher than what is usual in Brazilian 
companies, especially state-owned companies, but lower than the mobility in other private 
companies when compared to IOCs that work in the Brazilian petroleum sector (Abreu et al. 
2013:19). The current CEO of Petrobras, Maria das Graças Silva Foster holds degrees in both 
chemical engineering and economics, she has worked for Petrobras for 31 years and she has 
also worked for MME, this indicates that mobility through promotions is possible in the 
company (Petrobras Magazine 2012). 
 
7- Training programs  
In the early years Petrobras’ employees were trained abroad by foreign professionals. The 
focus on professionalism and training was high; the best graduates from Brazilian universities 
were employed by Petrobras, a selection based on merit and not on personal connection (de 
Oliveira 2012:522-523). Petrobras offers comprehensive training programs to all new 
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employees, there is a Petrobras University in three Brazilian states for training of personnel, 
there are also training, courses and promotion possibilities for experienced employees 
(Petrobras 2013).  
 
8- Innovation and pursuit of new ideas 
It is emphasised by Petrobras that employees have the opportunity to be creative and to 
develop their professional skills through research and development within the company 
(Petrobras 2013). “Entrepreneurship and innovation” is one of Petrobras’ core values 
(Petrobras 2013).  Petrobras’ first oil fields were onshore in Brazil and rather limited, so the 
need to search and explore new fields offshore has made the company very open to technical 
innovations and investments in creativity among the employees (de Oliveira 2012).  
 
b) Adaptability  
Principal-agent relation: 
1- Restructuring as a response to changes  
From the start in 1953 Petrobras had monopoly in the Brazilian petroleum sector and was 
responsible for commercial, policy-related and regulatory issues (Thurber et al. 2011:9). After 
having built human and institutional capital within Petrobras and the NOC had grown to a 
robust company, the government restructured in order to prevent the NOC becoming a “state 
within the state” by removing Petrobras’ monopoly and creating ANP as a regulatory agent in 
1997 (Thurber et al. 2011:10, Rodriguez and Suslick 2009:11).  
 
Even though the 1988 constitution consolidated Petrobras’ monopoly, a constitutional 
amendment from 1995 made part-privatization of Petrobras possible and allowed participation 
of national and international capital in the petroleum sector. This also allowed Petrobras to 
engage in joint ventures and invest and operate abroad (Sennes and Narciso 2009:40).  
In the 1975 Brazil was dependent on oil imports and the oil prices were high. Increased 
petroleum exploration in Brazil was expensive since the reserves were in geologically 
challenging locations. The government then decided to allow risk contracts where 
international oil companies were allowed to partner with Petrobras and pay for the risky 
explorations, and they would then split the finding with Petrobras if oil was found (Baer 
2008:189).   
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2- Investments  
From the beginning Petrobras received substantial help from the state in form of tax 
reductions, finances and favorable regulations in order to develop competence and capacity to 
produce petroleum domestically and reduce Brazil’s dependence on energy imports (de 
Oliveira 2012:548-549). Since the goal of self-sufficiency has been guiding in Brazilian 
energy policy, the government kept investments in Petrobras high in order to expand the 
domestic oil production in Brazil, this gave Petrobras a continued opportunity to explore new 
areas and technologies (Guan 2010:81-82) 
 
3- Research  
After the creation of a national oil company Brazilian universities were encouraged to 
establish and offer studies within geology, engineering, management and technology in order 
to build a solid Brazilian professional research environment in petroleum related disciplines 
(de Oliveira 2012:523). The state funding of petroleum research is mainly channelled through 
Petrobras, and the NOC has cooperation agreements with a number of state universities, 
focused on educating Brazilians to develop solutions for the future of the Brazilian petroleum 
sector (Mansoori et al. 2001:74-75). The Brazilian government, MME and Petrobras have 
since the beginning been reluctant to let foreigners into the sector and investments in domestic 
education and research has been a priority (ibid.).   
 
4- Risk aversion 
Since the Brazilian government prioritized national control of the petroleum resources and 
increased production of oil to better oil self-sufficiency over commercial economic goals, the 
government allowed Petrobras to take risks in the investments and exploration in the sector 
and exercised little detailed control of the decisions made by the NOC (Thurber and Hults 
2012). The Brazilian oil reserves are not easily accessible, and MME has been willing to 
allow and invest in high risk projects in order to develop the necessary deep-water technology 
(Guan 2010).  
 
NOC: 
5- Technological development 
Petrobras has continuously developed its technology to operate in deeper and deeper waters 
off the Brazilian coast and is currently one of the world leaders in deepwater oil production 
(Thurber and Hults 2012).  
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Even though Brazil has discovered large new reserves of oil and gas, the country depends on 
imports of gas from Bolivia to cover almost one third of its natural gas needs. When Bolivia 
nationalized its gas sector in 2005, Petrobras saw it as a threat to gas supply in Brazil and 
launched several new projects. The main project was to invest heavily in gas exploration and 
production in Brazil, but also in regasification technology to improve the possibility to import 
LNG from overseas (Sennes and Narciso 2009:36).  
6- Competitiveness 
Petrobras is among the largest energy companies in the world and tops the ranking of the most 
valuable brands in Latin America (Denis 2012). Petrobras has since the 1990’s been 
considered a world leading company in deepwater and ultra-deep offshore petroleum 
exploration and production (Fishman 2012:5). With the end of the monopoly Petrobras also 
had to compete with other companies for the best employees. According to Abreu et al. 
(2013:19) Petrobras was able to adapt to this new competition relatively well through offering 
job security, new training programs and other benefits to keep experienced staff and attract 
the best of the new talents.  
 
7- Efficiency  
Due to fixed price payments from the state and the monopoly situation of Petrobras until 
1997, the company grew overstaffed and relatively inefficient compared to private oil 
companies (Fishman 2010:4). The government found too many human resources within the 
petroleum sector to be tied up in Petrobras, and ordered the company to change the policy 
from stable, permanent positions to more contract hiring (Abreu 2013:2). The Petrobras 
workforce steadily declined after this, from more than 50 000 in 1994, to just above 30 000 in 
2001, at the same time a strategy to increase efficiency and innovation was implemented 
(ibid.). The productivity of Petrobras did not decline however, the number of barrels of oil 
produced daily increased while the number of employees declined (Abreu 2013:2). Among 
peer NOCs and IOCs Petrobras is now considered to be very efficient and well-managed (de 
Oliveira 2012:515).  
 
8- Research and development 
In 1968 Petrobras opened the Cenpes research center to meet the technological demands of 
the company. Cenpes soon became the largest research center in Latin America and the 
research led Petrobras to become one of the world leading companies within petroleum 
technology and an important patent holder (Petrobras 2013). Cenpes is “engaged in research 
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activities in almost all areas of petroleum production operations and is widely known for its 
innovations in petroleum drilling in deep water reaching record depths” (Mansoori et al. 
2001:74). “Readiness to change” is also one of Petrobras’ ten core values (Petrobras 2013).  
 
9- Risk aversion 
Through Petrobras’ monopoly the NOC could shift its risk in exploration and production over 
to the Brazilian state and oil consumers (Thurber and Hults 2012). Petrobras also took risks in 
order to explore new areas, especially the expansion to overseas investments in the 1970’s 
were risky, but the company still went through with the projects and was able to expand its 
experience and knowledge (de Oliveira 2012:527).  
 
c) Mission  
Principal-agent relation: 
1- Long-term objectives  
The main objectives in the petroleum sector for the Brazilian governments since the creation 
of Petrobras in 1954 has been national control of the oil reserves and self-sufficiency in oil 
supply (Rodriguez and Suslick 2009:8, Sennes and Narciso 2009:27, Baer 2008:217). These 
main objectives have throughout the years guided all the political decisions for the sector, 
regardless of political regime. These objectives have been characterized as national interests 
and in cases of disagreement between the actors in the sector, the governments have made the 
decisions they found to be in accordance with the national interests (de Oliveira 2012, Guan 
2010).  
 
2- Both economic and non-economic goals 
The long-term objectives outlined above have both economic and non-economic, more 
ideological aspects. The development of the petroleum sector in Brazil has been closely 
connected to the goal of national sovereignty and independence and the development of 
petroleum sector capacity, professionals and national content have been important goals from 
the start, and have been integrated in the decision making of MME, Petrobras and later ANP 
(Guan 2010, de Oliveira 2012).  
 
NOC: 
3- Overarching strategies and values  
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“Integrated growth, profitability and socio-environmental responsibility” are the keywords of 
Petrobras’ corporate strategy (Petrobras 2013). Petrobras also has ten core values. Some of 
them are related to economic performance, growth and productivity, while others are non-
economic such as diversity, sustainable development and respect for life (ibid.).  
 
4- Goals and objectives 
Petrobras has often worked with concrete future goals such as the goal to reach production of 
500 000 barrels a day within 1985 (de Olriveira 2012:533). Currently, the company has a 
vision for 2020 to be one among the world’s five largest integrated energy companies and the 
preferred choice of stakeholders (Petrobras 2013). These overarching goals are communicated 
throughout the company, and in times of external stress and change, such as the instable 
economic and political situation in Brazil in the mid-1980, the goals are maintained and 
constitute a guideline for the employees (de Oliveira 2012:533).  
 
          d) Consistency 
Principal-agent relation: 
1- Clear communication 
The communication between MME, ANP and Petrobras is frequent and open. The Brazilian 
petroleum law clearly outlines the national objectives in the petroleum sector and the actors in 
the sector all share these objectives and work in dialogue to fulfill them (Brazil Gov. 1997, de 
Oliveira 2012). In conflicts of interest between MME and Petrobras, MME has made 
decisions based on the national objectives and Petrobras has been loyal in implementing 
decisions (Abreu et al. 2013, de Oliveira 2012).  
 
2- Clear expectations 
The Petroleum law outlines the National Congress’ expectations to all the actors in the 
petroleum sector in Brazil. There is a clear focus on national development where the roles of 
MME, ANP and Petrobras are clearly outlined (Brazil Gov. 1997). The CEO of Petrobras is in 
close dialogue with the government, and also communicates Petrobras’ expectations back to 
MME (de Oliveira 2012, Cowley and Magalhaes 2013).  
 
3- Shared values 
The Brazilian petroleum sector, from MME, through ANP and Petrobras to the different oil 
platforms and gasoline stations has always been linked to the Brazilian national feeling of 
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independent development. The sector has had an important economic and symbolic role in the 
larger Brazilian national project and the different actors in the sector have depended on each 
other, but have also shared the acknowledgment that their commitment made a difference for 
the country (de Oliveira 2012, Abreu et al. 2013).   
 
NOC: 
4- Integration of values and expectations 
Through training programs for all new employees the core values of Petrobras are 
communicated and segmented throughout the company. The core values include “integration” 
and “proud to be Petrobras”, indicating a strong focus on creating a company identity and 
cooperation among employees, the shared values of all the employees are called the 
“intangible assets” of the company (Petrobras 2013). The values also emphasize the pride in 
being a Brazilian company, linking the company’s performance to national development 
(ibid.). In 2009 Petrobras scored the maximum 100 points in human capital development on 
the Dow Jones Sustainability index (Abreu 2013:2).  
 
Table 5.3 Organizational culture Brazil - Summary table  
Cultural trait Indicator score Total score 
Involvement in the principal- 
agent relationship 
1. high 
2. medium/high 
3. medium/high 
4. high 
- The Brazilian petroleum sector 
scores medium to high on 
involvement. 
- Petrobras scores high on three of 
four involvement indicators, only 
the internal mobility indicates 
lower involvement in Petrobras. 
  
Involvement in Petrobras 5. high 
6. medium 
7. high 
8. high 
Adaptability in the principal- 
agent relationship 
1. high 
2. high 
3. high 
4. high 
- The Brazilian petroleum sector 
scores high on all adaptability 
indicators. 
- Petrobras scores medium to high 
on adaptability, the medium 
scores are on efficiency focus and 
risk aversion 
Adaptability in Petrobras 5. high 
6. high 
7. medium 
8. high 
9. medium 
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Mission in the principal- 
agent relationship 
1. high 
2. high 
- Both the Brazilian petroleum 
sector as a whole and Petrobras 
score high on the mission 
indicators Mission in Petrobras 3. high 
4. high 
Consistency in the principal- 
agent relationship 
1. high 
2. high 
3. high 
- Both the Brazilian petroleum 
sector as a whole and Petrobras 
score high on the consistency 
indicators Consistency in Petrobras 4. high 
 
5.2.4 Organizational culture in the Brazilian petroleum sector  
It is difficult to completely separate the principal and the agent in the Brazilian petroleum 
sector. The ties between the leadership in Petrobras and the Brazilian political elite have been 
strong from the start and it is therefore not surprising that the involvement factor in the 
organizational culture in the petroleum sector is high. The development of the Brazilian 
petroleum sector has been a national project where the cooperation between the state as the 
principal and Petrobras as the agent, has been crucial for advancement.  
The cultural trait of high involvement in both the sector as a whole and within Petrobras is 
nevertheless somewhat contrary to the previous studies of national culture in Brazil, where the 
national culture results to be hierarchical and scores low on individualism. An explanation of 
this difference between the culture in the petroleum sector and in the society as a whole can 
be that the sector has been created from scratch with emphasis on the creation of strong 
professional bases in Brazil. The goal of self-sufficiency has guided the cultural development 
in the new sector towards innovation and emphasis on fostering the best professionals to make 
the best possible technical solutions, regardless of their hierarchical position.  
The high mission oriented culture combined with resources located in geologically 
challenging places, has in this way encouraged a culture of high involvement. It was clear 
from the start that politicians could not decide to attain the national goals without involving 
professional from the petroleum company in decision-making and giving them autonomy to 
make adequate decisions for development.     
Even though the political and economic situations were often unstable in Brazil until the mid-
1990’s, the organizational culture in the petroleum sector scores high on both mission and 
consistency. These cultural traits are in accordance with the national cultural trait of long-term 
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orientation, and long-term overarching goals were combined with more concrete short-term 
goals for Petrobras to fulfill on behalf of the government. Petrobras has own company values 
that are consistent throughout the company, but these values are also well connected to the 
political goals for the whole sector, this has also continued after the part-privatization.   
The organizational culture in the sector nevertheless also scores high on adaptability. The 
Ministry of Mines and Energy kept investing in Petrobras to meet new challenges caused by 
changes in society, volatile oil prices and geological difficulties. The mission of enhancing 
Brazilian national development did not hinder Petrobras from investing abroad and increasing 
its adaptability through technological developments. The solution to part-privatize Petrobas 
was a combination of high mission and high adaptability culture. Brazil had to liberalize its 
economy in the 1990’s to meet the debt and low economic performance inherited from the 
1980’s. However, due to the strong mission culture within the petroleum sector, Petrobras was 
one of the very few state-owned companies that were not fully privatized in the 1990’s.  
 
6. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Through the analysis of the indicators of high involvement, high adaptability, high mission 
and high consistency in the petroleum sectors in Norway and Brazil, I have found that both 
the two sectors, with emphasis on the principal-agent relationship, and the two national oil 
companies Statoil and Petrobras, have organizational cultures that score high or medium to 
high on all the four cultural traits.  
The organizational culture of the principal-agent relationship and the organizational culture in 
the national oil companies have developed simultaneously and are overlapping and 
interdependent. Even though the companies Statoil and Petrobras have their own 
organizational cultures, their cultures have developed as answers to the mission the 
companies were given by the governments.  
Both in Norway and in Brazil the overarching goal of national control of the petroleum sector 
have guided the management decisions in the sector and included the sector in the larger 
national development plans. In Norway the petroleum sector was included in the plan to 
maintain and strengthening the welfare state, and the research experience, industrial and 
technological development and infrastructure the Norwegian people could gain from the 
sector was just as important as the resource rents. In Brazil the petroleum sector development 
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was one part of the puzzle for industrialization and modernization of the country. A high 
mission culture thus already existed in both sectors and companies from the beginning. 
As table 2.1 in section 2 shows, the cultural trait of mission is oriented towards a stable 
direction for the organization to deal with external challenges. It is therefore somewhat 
surprising that this cultural trait is closely connected to the internal oriented high involvement 
in both petroleum sectors and NOCs in Norway and Brazil. The overarching non-economic 
missions that were guiding the Norwegian and the Brazilian sectors and their NOCs, in both 
cases had involvement of actors and professionalism in decision-making inhered in them, the 
missions were not accomplishable without a high involvement organizational culture. An 
organizational culture that combines the traits of external oriented high mission and internal 
oriented high involvement has thus enhanced the possibility of success in petroleum sector 
management in both Norway and Brazil.   
One of the goals for the governments was the continued national control of the sector, and this 
depended on the survival of Statoil and Petrobras. The petroleum sectors in both Norway and 
Brazil score somewhat higher than the oil companies when it comes to adaptability. Both 
Statoil and Petrobras have their lowest scores here. Looking at the score on the indicators it is 
efficiency focus and risk aversion that have medium score for both companies, and these 
indicator had lower scores before the part-privatizations than they have currently.  
Adaptability costs to external changes that could harm the companies were taken by the 
government in order to shield the companies and allow them to grow also at times when they 
might not have grown, or even survived if they had been exposed to full market competition. 
This changed when the adaptability within Statoil and Petrobras was high enough for the 
companies to meet external challenges in competition with other companies. Both Statoil and 
Petrobras scored high on adaptability at the time they were part-privatized. The governments 
also adapted to the new situation of large oil companies that needed to invest abroad in order 
to continue growing, and the part-privatizations are also signs of the sector’s adaptive 
capacity. High adaptability has been important for the ability to succeed in petroleum 
management in Norway and Brazil, first for the principal-agent relationship, and later for the 
national oil companies.  
To ensure high consistency is one of the reasons for creating a NOC in the first place. Other 
oil companies could have done the agent role for the state, but the state wants an agent that is 
built on the values that benefit the state’s goals for the sector. According to Marcel (2006), the 
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petroleum sector is a high prestige sector in most societies. The best professionals are 
recruited to the national oil companies and these NOCs often represent a national pride among 
employees, but also in the society in general. This was also the case in Norway and Brazil, 
although in contrast to some of the countries in Marcel’s (2006) study, Statoil and Petrobras 
were not the only large industrial companies in their countries and they had some competition 
from other companies and sectors for the best talents.  
Nevertheless, high consistency throughout the sector and the NOCs was probably already a 
part of the organizational cultures from the start, aided by the high mission. To keep 
consistency high over time could be a larger challenge since the principal and the agent can 
develop different interests and also new, smaller principal-agent relationships emerge within 
institutions and companies when the sector grows.  
The close relationships and quite high mobility between the leaders of the energy ministries 
and the leaders of the NOCs have probably kept the consistency in the principal-agent 
relationship high in both countries and this has had a positive effect on success. Within Statoil 
the combination of high involvement and high consistency has given the employees 
meaningful common values and goals for cooperation combined with opportunities to follow 
individual ideas and careers within the company. This has been important in order to attain 
success in a national culture that highly values individuality. 
In Petrobras the high consistency is linked to the pride of working for a company that 
contributes to the national development. Individuality and mobility has traditionally scored 
low in the Brazilian society, and Petrobras has offered a secure and well-paid workplace with 
larger possibilities for personal professional development than many other Brazilian 
companies (Abreu et al. 2013). High consistency in Petrobras is therefore less dependent on 
high involvement than the case is for Statoil, but the high consistency in Petrobras has been 
important in order to attain success in the petroleum sector.  
The combination of the four organizational cultural traits in the petroleum sectors and NOCs 
in Norway and Brazil supports the hypothesis presented in figure 3.1 that all the four traits are 
necessary for success. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis I have studied the petroleum sectors in Norway and Brazil in order to understand 
why both these countries have been successful in their petroleum management. I have used a 
comparative method based on a selection of two most different cases. Norway has a national 
context that is favorable to success and Brazil does not, yet both have succeeded in petroleum 
management.  
 
This thesis has aimed to answer the exploratory research question of how an analysis of 
organizational cultural factors contribute to a better understanding and explanation of success 
in the petroleum sector management in Norway and Brazil. Through the two cases studies, I 
have analyzed the organizational culture in the petroleum sector in both countries with the 
aim of exploring whether this explanatory variable explains the similar success outcome in 
both countries. The hypothesis that a strong organizational culture positively influences 
success in the management of the petroleum sector has been strengthened through this study. 
 
The analysis of organizational cultural factors in the petroleum sectors in the two case 
countries has contributed to the understanding of how the states’ petroleum ministries and the 
NOCs have developed together, and been interdependent in order to develop the successful 
management. By looking behind the formal structures and analyzing the cultural traits that are 
the fundament for decision-making and actions in the sectors, I have found similarities 
between the petroleum sectors in Norway and Brazil that can explain why the sectors have 
both been successful despite the differences between the countries on other explanatory 
variables.  
 
I have found that the four organizational cultural traits; involvement, adaptability, mission and 
consistency are dependent on each other and enhance each other in the petroleum sectors in 
both Norway and Brazil. The cultural traits below the visible surface of actions and artifacts 
are difficult to measure in a definite way. Culture is also a changing phenomenon and cultural 
traits can become stronger or weaker with time. In this thesis I have measured the cultural 
traits through analyzing available data sources, and the findings in this thesis can be used as a 
building block for further studies of the relationship between organizational culture and 
success in petroleum rich countries.  
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In the literature on the resource curse, the principal-agent relationship plays an important role. 
The findings in this thesis show that organizational cultural factors can explain how 
interdependent the principal and the agent are in the petroleum sector. Both case countries 
found a balance between the principal’s control of the agent and the agent’s independence to 
develop and grow. The creation of non-economic missions and goals for the petroleum sector 
strengthened the development of a shared organizational culture in the principal-agent 
relationship. This finding could also be interesting for other resource rich countries that want 
to diminish asymmetric information through creating a NOC, and also want the NOC to 
develop into a loyal, as well as independent, internationally competitive company in the long-
term.  
 
Even though the same organizational cultural traits can be identified as high in both Norway 
and Brazil, there are some differences between the countries, differences that can also be 
related to the national cultural traits of the countries. It is therefore possible that the 
organizational cultural traits emphasized in this thesis are related to success in a different way 
in other resource rich countries. As mentioned in the background chapter, the study of culture 
as a phenomenon has also been debated in the literature, and since culture has an abstract 
nature that by definition mingles with everything, it can be difficult to distinguish cultural 
traits from other explanatory variables, or to define the cultural traits within social practice. 
The qualitative approach of this thesis has made it possible to identify organizational cultural 
traits in the petroleum sectors in both Norway and Brazil, but a larger study with supplements 
of both more in-depth qualitative methods and quantitative methods could be useful in order 
to strengthen and improve the arguments in this thesis.  
 
However, since the same traits of organizational culture can explain the success in the 
petroleum sectors in countries as different as Norway and Brazil, it is reasonable to believe 
that they would be positive for success also in other petroleum rich countries. Similar results 
from only two case countries is however not enough to be able to generalize the results to a 
larger universe of cases, this would have to be empirically tested in more case countries. The 
results in this thesis can also be a building block for generating variables for a statistical 
analysis of the relationship between organizational culture and success in a large sample of 
cases. 
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This thesis has demonstrated that is useful to use the theory of organizational culture to better 
understand and explain the similar outcome of success in the management of petroleum 
resources in Norway and Brazil. The use of this theory in further theory development within 
the field of natural resource management can therefore be useful for future research that aims 
to understand successful outcomes in resource rich countries.  
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